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Text
 [*145]  In October 2015, the United States completed negotiations for the TransPacific Partnership ("TPP"), a free 
trade agreement among twelve Pacific Rim states.   1 According to the White House, TPP will "rewrite the rules of 
trade," will include "high standards . . . that . . . upgrade our existing agreements," and will "have a profound impact 
on . . . how we invest in the developing world."   2 By contrast, the leading presidential candidates from both parties 
offer distinctly negative assessments of TPP. Hillary Clinton has opined that TPP does not meet the "very high" bar 
she would set for producing new jobs, increasing wages, and protecting national security.   3 To the contrary, she 
has emphasized the "risk[]" that such trade agreements "will end up doing more harm than good for hard-working 
American families."   4 Even more emphatically, Donald Trump has declared TPP to be a "horrible deal" that would 
"lead to nothing but trouble," and was "designed for China to . . . take advantage of everyone."   5 Thus, while 
differing substantially in tone and orientation, statements from the White House and the campaign trail seem to 
coincide on the point that TPP marks a significant turn in the course of U.S. trade and investment policy.
1 
 Don Lee, Fight Over Pacific Trade Agreement Begins, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pacific-trade-20151105-story.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); Don Lee,Signing of Trans-
Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Opens Up Tough Battle in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4. 2016, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pacific-trade-agreement-signed-20160204-story.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
2 
 The White House, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: What You Need to Know About President Obama's Trade Agreement 
[hereinafter What You Need to Know], available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/economy/trade (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
3 
 Peter Nicholas & William Maudlin, Hillary Clinton Comes Out Against Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
8, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clinton-comes-out-against-trans-pacific -partnership-trade-deal-




 John Brinkley, Donald Trump: Stalking the Wild TPP, FORBES, Nov. 12, 2015, available at 
http://vvww.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2015/11/12/donald-trump-stalking-the-wild-tpp/#55a0884870cc (last visited Feb. 5, 
2016). China is not among the twelve Pacific Rim states expected to ratify TPP.See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., What Is 
TPP?, available at https://ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (listing the twelve Pacific Rim states expected to ratify TPP).
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 [*146]  Given the descriptions of TPP in political circles, one feels a sense of irony when reviewing its chapter on 
foreign investment and investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS"). As recognized by a diverse range of observers, 
TPP's investment chapter closely resembles analogous provisions in free trade agreements ("FTAs") recently 
concluded by the United States.   6 Because those include FTAs already in force between the United States and six 
other states parties to TPP, some observers have gone so far as to describe TPP's investment chapter as "largely 
redundant" with the status quo in U.S. treaty practice.   7 Such assessments directly contradict the perception that 
TPP heralds important shifts in U.S. policy, at least in respect to the protection of foreign direct investment ("FDI") 
under international law.
Although TPP's investment chapter may seem unremarkable when compared to recent trends in U.S. treaty 
practice, it appears much more dynamic when viewed from the perspective of U.S. investors having investment 
claims against other states parties.   8 Viewed from that angle, TPP's investment chapter becomes a fascinating 
puzzle that changes the state of play for U.S. investors in dramatically different ways, depending on the state party 
and the nature of the claims involved.   9
Seeking to develop the points just made, Part I recounts the historical development of U.S. investment treaty 
practice.   10 Part II describes the broad contours of TPP, and provides a more detailed examination of its 
investment chapter.   11 Part III examines assessments of TPP's investment chapter and, in particular, its 
conformity with recent U.S. treaty practice.   12 By contrast, Part IV identifies the ways in which TPP's investment 
chapter alters the state of play for particular U.S. investors. In so doing, Part IV(A) describes the ways that TPP 
alters the state of play for U.S. investors in states parties that do not yet have FTAs with the United States.   13 Part 
IV(B), in turn, explains how TPP alters the state of play for U.S. investors in states parties that already have FTAs 
with the United States, often in dramatically different ways depending on the particular host state and the particular 
claims involved.   14 Part IV(C) discusses the possibility that even familiar investment treaty provisions may operate 
in unexpected and unwelcome ways when applied to the multilateral context of TPP.   15 Adopting a wider frame of 
reference, Part V concludes with a brief discussion of the under-appreciated, geo-strategic purposes of layering 
TPP on top of several existing FTAs.   16
 [*147]  I. HISTORY
6 
  See infra notes 423-25 and accompanying text.
7 
  See infra note 434 and accompanying text.
8 
  See infra note 436 and accompanying text.
9 
  See infra notes 437-38 and accompanying text.
10 
  See infra notes 17-312 and accompanying text.
11 
  See infra notes 313-413 and accompanying text.
12 
  See infra notes 414-35 and accompanying text.
13 
  See infra notes 440-80 and accompanying text.
14 
  See infra notes 481-560 and accompanying text.
15 
  See infra notes 561-74 and accompanying text.
16 
  See infra notes 575-606 and accompanying text.
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *145
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A generation ago, the United States developed an investment treaty program to advance geo-political (as opposed 
to chiefly economic) goals.  17 Although the basic contours of U.S. investment treaties have not changed, their 
elaboration reflects a series of four distinct phases, each one of which responded to shifts in historical and political 
context. To illustrate these themes, Part I describes the United States' adoption of an investment treaty program, its 
enduring structure, and the shifts in textual nuance that accompanied four phases of evolution.
A. Phase One: The 1984 U.S. Model BIT
During the decades leading up to the 1970s, the United States faced an environment in which the forces of 
communism and decolonization threatened to disrupt the global order in which capitalism had thrived.   18 The 
expansion of  [*148]  communism and the process of decolonization led to changes of government and dramatic 
shifts in policy across the globe.   19 Newly established governments sought to consolidate their authority and 
independence, often by seizing the main levers of the economy.   20 As a result, U.S. and other Western investors 
faced waves of expropriations,   21 typically by governments that recognized no obligation to compensate for the 
reversal of what they saw as an unfair status quo.   22
Contemporaneously with the uncoordinated waves of nationalizations, communist and newly independent states 
joined forces at the United Nations, strategically using their new majority in the General Assembly to call for a New 
International Economic Order ("NIEO"), in which states could take investment property for public purposes without 
incurring any obligation to compensate foreign investors under international law.   23 Although it seems implausible 
to the  [*149]  modern ear, the calls for a NIEO became so sharp that the United States Supreme Court expressed 
doubts that customary international law continued to require compensation for the taking of investment property 
and, in any event, flatly refused to hear such claims on prudential grounds.   24
In the tense and uncertain environment just described,   25 Western European states successfully launched a 
bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") program, pursuant to which developing countries undertook to guarantee foreign 
17 
 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 
209-10 (1988) (explaining that the State Department proposed the development of BITs in 1977 for the purposes of enhancing 
the security of U.S. investments in states parties, reaffirming the importance of protecting U.S. FDI as an element of foreign 
policy, and establishing a body of state practice that would support traditional U.S. views regarding customary international law 
on the protection of FDI); see also K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, 
Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 105, 110-11 (1986) (describing how the "BIT initiative 
gained momentum within the bureaucracy in the mid 1970s after a cycle of expropriation activity by developing countries," and 
explaining that "BITs were proposed as a means of strengthening principles of customary international law and practice as 
observed and advocated by the United States").
The BIT program did not aim to stimulate outbound U.S. FDI because organized labor in the United States opposed such 
policies. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 47 (2009); see 
also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 26 (2009) ("While organized labor 
could be expected to oppose programs that might result in the export of investment and, thus, jobs, there was no evidence that 
the BITs would promote outward investment"); Gudgeon, supra, at 111-12 (opining that U.S. BITs were "not designed to 
catalyze investment decisions," and explaining that "the absence of evidence of a capital flow relationship" was "advantageous 
in rallying support for the BIT program, since evidence of a positive correlation between investment treaties and increased 
capital flow abroad could have spurred opposition by organized labor and regional economic interest groups within the United 
States").
18 
  See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 41-42 (2010) (identifying the spread of 
communism and decolonization as two of the major forces that shaped the international investment regime after World War II); 
see also ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 483 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the combined force of 
decolonization and the spread of communism in sparking nationalizations of FDI); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 
18-19 (describing the combined force of decolonization and the spread of communism sparking nationalizations of FDI and, 
thus, investment disputes).
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *147
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investors the sorts of protections that they had rejected as a matter of customary international law.   26 Given the 
successful launch of European BIT programs, the United States government resolved to launch its own investment 
treaty program in 1977.   27 Due to a lengthy inter-agency process, the United States took several years to adopt a 
model text for treaty negotiations.   28 Although the United States adopted negotiating texts in 1981 and 1983, those 
models proved unsatisfactory, due in part to excessive length.   29 They were replaced with a brief, seven-page 
negotiating text in 1984,   30 which essentially remained the model used by the United States for the next decade.   
31
 [*150]  In broad outline, one may divide the 1984 U.S. model BIT into three parts: (1) definitions;   32 (2) the host 
state's substantive obligations with respect to the treatment of covered investors and their investments;   33 and (3) 
the modalities for dispute resolution through arbitration proceedings brought directly by foreign investors against 
their host states.   34 While the content and relative emphasis on each part has shifted over time, the basic structure 
of U.S. investment treaties has not.   35
Turning to the content of the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, the first part sets forth a broad definition of "investments" entitled 
to treaty protection. In particular, it extends treaty protection to "every kind of investment . . . owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment 
contracts."   36 In addition, the definition sets forth a non-exclusive, illustrative list that includes "tangible and 
intangible property," "a company or shares of stock," "a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic 
value, and associated with an investment," "intellectual property," including "goodwill," "any right conferred by 
contract or law," and "any licenses and permits pursuant to law."   37
The next two articles of the 1984 U.S. Model BIT set forth the basic substantive guarantees that continue to lie at 
the heart of U.S. investment treaty practice. These include guarantees of national treatment, MFN treatment, and 
"fair and equitable treatment" for "investments" (with the last-mentioned concept not linked to international law).   38 




  See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 22 (2d ed. 2004) ("There was . . . a need 
felt on the part of the newly independent states to recover control over vital sectors of their economies from foreign investors . . . 
."); VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 42 (explaining that "newly independent states were fiercely protective of their 
independence and some of them came to regard foreign investment as a form of neocolonialism because it involved foreign 
control over the means of production").
21 
  See LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 483-84 (explaining that "nationalizations of all kinds took place" during "the quarter 
century following the end of World War II," particularly in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and nearly all the Arab states"); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, 
supra note 17, at 18-19 (describing "large-scale nationalizations of key sectors of the[] economies" in Eastern European states, 
China, Cuba, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia); SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 22 (describing "a wave of nationalizations of foreign property"); VANDEVELDE, supra 
note 17, at 25 ("Expropriations of American property in Brazil and Cuba in 1959 commenced two decades of repeated seizures 
of U.S. property overseas. One commentator, for example, reported 87 instances of expropriatory acts during a two-year period 
in the early 1970s."); Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 209 (explaining that "a series of expropriations of U.S. investment during the 
1960s and 1970s underscored the need for strong investment protection, while the rapid growth of U.S. overseas investment put 
more wealth at risk of expropriation").
22 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 41 (explaining that "new communist countries generally argued that no compensation 
for expropriated foreign property was owed, emphasizing that a restructuring of the national economy along communist or 
socialist lines was a different phenomenon than the seizure of isolated parcels of property within a liberal economic system); see 
also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 19 (describing how "newly independent and developing states asserted that, 
upon independence, states were entitled to review concession agreements that had been granted by colonial powers and, 
furthermore, maintained that compensation for expropriation of property would be based on national [as opposed to 
international] laws").
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *149
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establishment, maintenance or expansion of investments.   39 However, the treaty provisions dealing with 
performance requirements seem strikingly sparse and vague, extending only to requirements relating to export 
performance, use of local goods or services, and "any other similar requirements."   40
 [*151]  The 1984 U.S. Model BIT also prohibits direct and indirect expropriation of covered investments, except for 
a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process, and upon prompt payment of 
adequate and effective compensation.   41 Finally, the 1984 U.S. Model BIT contains a so-called "umbrella clause," 
in which the states parties undertake to "observe any obligation [they] may have entered into with regard to 
investments."   42 Although not universally accepted, the general view is that such umbrella clauses 
"internationalize" state contracts by transforming the host state's observance of contracts into a treaty obligation.   
43
 While representing the heart of substantive guarantees, the six undertakings mentioned above occupy only two 
pages of text.   44 In other words, the 1984 Model U.S. BIT elaborated concepts at an exceedingly high level of 
generality and, thus, left their specification by the arbitral tribunals constituted to hear investment disputes.   45
Despite the obvious importance of substantive disciplines, many observers regard the provisions on dispute 
settlement as the most innovative and significant aspect of the entire U.S. BIT program.   46 By providing for 
arbitration of claims brought directly by investors against host states under the ICSID Convention and the Additional 
Facility Rules of ICSID,   47 the 1984 U.S. Model BIT simultaneously gave investors effective tools to enforce their 
rights and eliminated the inevitable "politicization" of claims that occurs when states have to resolve investment 
claims at the level of intergovernmental relations.   48
 [*152]  Looking at the framework for arbitration established by the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, three factors stand out. 
First, the 1984 U.S. Model BIT permits arbitration for three categories of claims: (1) disputes involving the 
interpretation or application of investment agreements (contracts) between investors and their host states; (2) 
disputes involving the interpretation or application of investment authorizations issued by hosts states; and (3) 
disputes involving alleged violations of obligations set forth in the BIT.  49 Second, the 1984 U.S. Model BIT 
discouraged pursuit of local remedies in the sense that first recourse to "the courts of justice or administrative 
23 
 LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 489-92; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 31-32; VANDEVELDE, supra note 
18, at 47-48; see also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 2012); VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 25-26; Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 209.
24 
  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30, 436-37 (1964).
25 
  See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 5 (recognizing that "this period of confrontation led to insecurity about the 
customary international rules governing foreign investment"); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 41 (describing the 
development of BITs as "primarily a response to the uncertainties and inadequacies of the customary international law of state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens and their property").
26 
  See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 6-7; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 42-43; VANDEVELDE, 
supra note 18, at 54-56.
27 
 See Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 208-09 (describing the successful expansion of the European BIT program, and explaining 
that the launch of a U.S. BIT program in 1977 responded in part to that development); see also Gudgeon, supra note 17, at 109 
(recounting the successful development of BIT programs by European countries during the 1960s, and stating that the "legal 
Adviser's Office of the State Department . . . recommended that the United States emulate the European example"). According 
to some observers, U.S. business interests pressed the United States government to adopt an investment treaty program to 
secure the same sorts of protections already enjoyed by European competitors. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 
47; VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 25.
28 
 Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 210; Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model BITs, 2008-2009 
Y.B. INT'L INV. L & POL'Y 283, 283 [hereinafter Vandevelde, Comparison].
29 
 Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 210-11; Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 283.
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *150
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tribunals or agencies" of the host state would extinguish the right to demand arbitration.  50 Third, the 1984 U.S. 
Model BIT made no attempt to regulate the arbitration proceedings, to set time limits for asserting claims, or to 
impose any limitations on remedies. To the contrary, the 1984 U.S. Model BIT left all such questions to the 
arbitration rules and applicable principles of law.  51 Given the novelty of investor-state arbitration and the discretion 
conferred on tribunals to elaborate vague substantive obligations, the failure to regulate dispute settlement in more 
detail seems puzzling.
B. Phase Two: NAFTA's Investment Chapter
In December 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the final text of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
("NAFTA"),   52 which President William J. Clinton signed into law a year later,   53 and which entered into force as 
of January 1, 1994.   54 Chapter 11 of NAFTA regulates the treatment of investments made by  [*153]  nationals of 
one NAFTA state party on the territory of other states parties.   55 While Chapter 11 follows the broad, three-part 
structure of the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, it also represents just one component of a much broader trade agreement.   
56
 As a result, one finds significant shifts in details relating to definitions, substantive disciplines, and dispute 
settlement.   57
Starting with definitions, the most striking feature represents a narrowing of the definition of investments covered by 
Chapter 11.   58 Instead of an all-encompassing reference to "every kind of investment" followed by a non-exclusive 
list of illustrative examples,   59 Chapter 11 defines investment in terms of an exhaustive and closed list of eight 
categories, including an enterprise, equity securities, certain debt securities, certain loans to enterprises, certain 
interests that entitle the owner to share in income or profits of enterprises, certain interests that entitle the owner to 
share in assets of an enterprise on dissolution, tangible and intangible property, and commitments of capital to long-
term projects such as turnkey contracts or concessions.   60 Notably, this closed list omits a number of items that 
appeared in the 1984 U.S. Model BIT's illustrative list, including "a claim to money or a claim to performance having 
economic value, and associated with an investment," and "goodwill."   61
30 
  See Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 211 (describing the adoption of a "streamlined" and "much shorter" model text in 1984); 
Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 283 (recounting the adoption of a "shortened version" of the model in 1984); see 
also 1984 U.S. Model BIT, reprinted in VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 789.
31 
  See Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 283 (indicating that "with only isolated changes," the 1984 U.S. Model BIT 
"would remain the model in use for the next decade").
32 
 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 1.
33 
  Id. Arts. 2-4.
34 
  Id. Art. 6; see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 13 (indicating that BITs "typically consist of three parts," 
including "definitions," "substantive standards," and provisions on "dispute settlement"); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 
17, at 65 (describing the typical structure of BITs, which start with definitions, and continue with substantive disciplines, followed 
by provisions on dispute settlement).
35 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 5 ("The content of most BITs follows a typical pattern. Similar provisions appear in 
more or less the same order in nearly every BIT."); see also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 26 (2007) ("BITs tend to resemble each other in purpose and content"); NEWCOMBE & 
PARADELL, supra note 17, at 65 ("The actual content of [international investment agreements] also follows a pattern"); 
JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 126 (2010) ("Although the specific provisions of individual 
investment treaties are not uniform . . . , virtually all investment treaties address the same issues and they generally follow a 
similar structure").
36 
 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 1.
37 
  Id.
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *152
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 [*154]  Turning to substantive disciplines, NAFTA's investment chapter includes the same core undertakings as the 
1984 U.S. Model BIT, while elaborating or expanding them in ways generally designed to enhance the protection of 
foreign investment. For example, NAFTA extends the guarantees of national treatment and MFN treatment not just 
to investments, but also to investors, while specifying that the guarantees apply to all stages of investment activity, 
including establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.   62 While U.S. negotiators also considered extending the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment to 
investors (and not just to investments), they resolved not to do so based in part on concerns that such an extension 
could give rise to personal injury claims under NAFTA.   63 To the extent that NAFTA's drafters altered the 
guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, they arguably narrowed its scope by yoking it back to international law.   
64
Perhaps consistent with NAFTA's emphasis on trade liberalization, Chapter 11 substantially expanded the 
prohibition of performance requirements.   65 Whereas the 1984 U.S. Model BIT expressly prohibited only two types 
of requirements,   66 NAFTA's investment chapter increased the list to seven.   67 In addition, it clarified that the 
prohibition of performance requirements applied at almost all stages of investment, including the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or operation of investments.   68 Also, NAFTA broke new ground by 
prohibiting states parties from adopting measures that conditioned the receipt of an advantage on requirements to 
(a) achieve a given level of domestic content, (b) to purchase goods locally, (c) to relate the value or volume of 
imports to the value or volume of exports, or (d) to restrict local sales of the investor's goods by relating them to the 
value or volume of export performance.   69 Contrary to the 1984 U.S. Model BIT,   70 however, NAFTA's  [*155]  
investment chapter emphasized that its expanded list of prohibitions was not illustrative, but an exhaustive list of 
unlawful performance requirements.   71
Like the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, NAFTA's provision on expropriation forbids direct or indirect takings of investments, 
unless for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process, and upon prompt 
payment of adequate and effective compensation.   72 However, NAFTA's investment chapter breaks new ground 
38 
  Id. Art. 2(1)-(2).
39 




  Id. Art. 3(1).
42 
  Id. Art. 2(2).
43 
 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 166-75; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 437-38; SALACUSE, 
supra note 35, at 273-84; VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 257, 263-66; Gudgeon, supra note 17, at 126.
44 
  See 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Arts. 2-3.
45 
  Cf. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 460 (2010) (observing that 
"it is within investor-state arbitrations that the most important decisions about the investment regime are decided").
46 
  See SALACUSE, supra note 35, at 137 (describing investor-state arbitration under BITs as a "revolutionary innovation"); 
Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 239, 252 
(2012) ("Investor-state arbitration, as a mechanism to enforce the substance of BITs, was one of the most important innovations 
in BITs"); Philip J. MacFarlane, Comment, U.S and Chinese Investment Treaties in Latin America: Convergence or 
Competition?, 37 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 927, 939 (2015) (opining that "investor-state arbitration is often considered the most 
important investor protection in a BIT"); see also Jason Pierce, Note, A South American Investment Treaty: How the Region 
Might Attract Foreign Investment in a Wake of Resource Nationalism, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 417, 436 (2011) ("Perhaps one of 
the most important features of the [Energy Charter Treaty], is its section governing dispute resolution").
47 
 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 6(3).
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *153
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by identifying standards for valuation, including going concern value (a generous measurement of market value not 
previously embraced by developing states).   73 Also, NAFTA's investment chapter provides guidance on the 
calculation of exchange rates, depending on whether the host state elects to pay in a G7 currency or another 
currency.   74
While NAFTA Chapter 11 elaborates and expands substantive disciplines at the margins, its dispute settlement 
provisions represent one of the treaty's great achievements.   75 Among other things, it marks the first time that 
Mexico agreed to investor-state arbitration, as well as the first time that two OECD states agreed to investor-state 
arbitration.   76 Given these facts, and NAFTA's emphasis on dispute settlement in several areas,   77 it seems 
unsurprising that the drafters carefully sought to regulate the process of investor-state arbitration.
As in the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, NAFTA Chapter 11 allows investors to demand arbitration under the ICSID 
Convention and the Additional Facility Rules  [*156]  of ICSID.   78 In addition, however, it gives investors the option 
to demand arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,   79 which would be the sole choice for investment 
disputes brought by Canadian investors against Mexico, or Mexican investors against Canada, as neither of the 
states had ratified the ICSID Convention, thus foreclosing arbitration under the ICSID Convention or even under the 
Additional Facility Rules for such matters.   80
Regardless of the arbitration rules selected by the investor, however, NAFTA provides that those rules apply only 
as modified by Chapter 11.   81 Those modifications include a number of procedural refinements designed to 
encourage pursuit of alternative dispute settlement and local remedies, to streamline the arbitration process, to 
assist and to guide tribunals in the elaboration of substantive principles, and to control the exposure of states 
parties to liability.
Starting with the encouragement to pursue alternative dispute settlement and local remedies, Chapter 11 imposes 
two waiting periods before investors can bring claims. First, they must wait six months after the events giving rise to 
48 
 SALACUSE, supra note 35, at 373-74; SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 250; VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 432; Anthea 
Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 383 (2015); Eric 
Gillman, The End of Investor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis of Article 422 of the Constitution of 2008, 19 AM. REV. 
INT'L ARB. 269, 271 (2008); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 621, 626 (1993);  see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 576 ("From the standpoint of the U.S. government, the most 
important aspect of the investor-state disputes provision of the 1983 model was that it provided an effective remedy for investors 
without the involvement of the investor's government. To the extent that the investor-state disputes provision is effective, it also 
reduces the pressure on the United States to impose sanctions on an expropriating government.").
49 
 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 6(1).
50 
  Id. Art. 6(3)(a)(ii); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 580 ("The effect of this . . . condition obviously is to discourage 
resort to local remedies").
51 
 As a condition precedent to arbitration, however, the 1984 U.S. Model BIT does, however, require the expiration of six months 
following "the date on which the dispute arose." 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 6(3)(a). Drafters saw this as a "cooling-
off" period during which parties could seek resolution of differences through consultations and negotiations. VANDEVELDE, 
supra note 17, at 581.
52 
 David M. McPherson, Is the North American Free Trade Agreement Entitled to an Economically Rational Countervailing Duty 
Scheme?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 47, 48 (1993).
53 
 Natalie Sears, The Shadows that Became the Star of the Show: The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 21 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 185, 185 (2015).
54 
 David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: The Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 165 (1997).
55 
 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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their claims.   82 Second, they must give written notice of intent to bring claims 90 days before actually submitting 
them to arbitration.   83 In principle, these requirements create a space in which investors and host states may 
negotiate their differences or have recourse to other forms of dispute settlement.   84 Also, NAFTA's investment 
chapter encourages pursuit of local remedies in two ways. Unlike the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, which required an 
election between local remedies and investor-state arbitration,   85 NAFTA permits investors to have first recourse 
to local remedies and, then, to pursue arbitration, provided that they waive in writing the right to initiate or continue 
any other dispute settlement processes relating to the measure(s) alleged to violate NAFTA's investment chapter.   
86
 In addition, NAFTA' s investment chapter further encourages pursuit of local remedies by exempting from the 
waiver requirement proceedings seeking injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief (not involving claims for 
damages) from the host state's judicial or administrative tribunals.   87
 [*157]  Turning to provisions designed to streamline the arbitration process, NAFTA's investment chapter 
designates the Secretary-General of ICSID as the appointing authority for arbitration proceedings and empowers 
the incumbent to appoint arbitrators to any vacancies remaining 90 days after submission of a claim to arbitration.   
88
 In addition, NAFTA's investment chapter permits consolidation of two or more arbitrations that have a common 
question of law or fact, provided that consolidation would promote the fair and efficient resolution of claims.   89 
Upon receipt of a request for consolidation, the Secretary-General of ICSID has 60 days to appoint a tribunal to 
hear the request and, if it grants consolidation, to hear the consolidated matters.   90 The consolidation tribunal 
operates under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and it seems relevant to mention that the disputing parties have 
no right under Chapter 11 to participate in the appointment of the members of consolidation tribunals.   91
Under NAFTA's investment chapter, states parties have two ways of assisting and guiding tribunals in the 
elaboration of norms. First, under Article 1128, non-disputing states parties have the right to make submissions to 
tribunals on questions of interpretation of NAFTA.   92 To the extent that the submissions of all three states parties 
coincide, some tribunals have regarded the shared views as a subsequent practice that establishes the agreement 
56 
  See Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment -- The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183, 186 (1998) (describing NAFTA as the "broadest trade agreement in history").
57 
  See Lucy Reed & Robert Kirkness, Old Seeland, New Netherland and New Zealand: Some Thoughts on the Possible 
"Discovery" of Investment Treaty Arbitration in New Zealand, 43 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 687, 704 (2012) (indicating 
that, when combined with negotiations on trade in goods, trade in services, protection of intellectual property and numerous 
other topics, the outcomes of negotiations on the protection of foreign investment become harder to predict and more likely to 
shift as a result of trade-offs made on other topics).
58 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 133-34 (opining that the NAFTA's definition of investment has two "unique" features, 
namely (1) the use of an exhaustive list of assets that qualify as "investments," and (2) the population of that list with content that 
differs from the illustrative lists found in U.S. Model BITs).
59 
  See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
60 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1139.
61 
  Compare id. with 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 1(b); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 134 (observing 
that NAFTA departed from the 1984 U.S. Model BIT by excluding "goodwill" from the definition of "investments" covered by 
NAFTA's investment chapter). According to one observer, the United States, Canada and Mexico have all argued that market 
share does not qualify as an investment for purposes of NAFTA. VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 133. The United States has 
also expressed the view that goodwill and customer base do not qualify as investments for purposes of NAFTA. Id. In reaching 
this conclusion, the United States has in part relied on the exhaustive definition of investments under NAFTA. Id. It has also 
relied on the broader assertion that goodwill, market share, and customer base do not represent property interests capable of 
expropriation under international law. Id. at 133-34.
62 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Arts. 1102(1)-(2), 1103(1)-(2).
63 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 313-14.
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of the states parties on the application of the treaty for purposes of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.   93 Other tribunals have approached the submissions with a degree of caution inasmuch as they 
reflect the self-interested views of perpetual respondents in NAFTA arbitrations.   94
In addition to non-disputing party submissions, the trade ministers of the three NAFTA parties also have the right to 
convene as the Free Trade Commission and, in that capacity, to adopt joint interpretations of NAFTA, which 
tribunals must accept as binding.   95 As of this writing, the Free Trade Commission has invoked the power to make 
joint interpretations only once.   96 That involved a so-called "interpretation" of fair and equitable treatment to be 
coextensive with the  [*158]  minimum standard of treatment for aliens required by customary international law, 
which observers widely regarded as an effort to narrow the scope of substantive protection, to swing the outcomes 
of pending matters in favor of the states parties, and to force a particular tribunal to reopen a partial award that had, 
in fact, become res judicata.   97 While observers have debated whether the incident truly involved an interpretation 
or an ultra vires amendment of NAFTA,   98 the fact is that the optics conveyed an unfortunate image of self-
dealing.   99 This may explain the states parties' reluctance to adopt any further interpretations of disputed 
provisions.
In addition to assisting and guiding tribunals in the development of norms, the states parties benefit from a handful 
of NAFTA provisions designed to limit their exposure to liability. First, Chapter 11 includes a fairly short statute of 
limitations, which requires investors to submit claims within three years after they have acquired knowledge of 
alleged treaty violations and knowledge that they have incurred loss or damage.  100 Second, unlike the 1984 U.S. 
Model BIT, NAFTA's investment chapter only permits investor-state arbitration of claims that allege treaty violations; 
it does not permit investor-state arbitration of claims alleging violations of investment agreements or investment 
authorizations.  101 Consistent with the exclusion of investment agreements and investment authorizations from 
dispute settlement, Chapter 11 omits the umbrella clause,  102 which would have elevated the host state's 
contractual commitments to treaty obligations.  103 Third, Chapter 11 limits the remedies that tribunals may award. 
Specifically, tribunals may only award monetary damages plus interest, or restitution.  104 In the event that tribunals 
64 
  See NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1105(1) (requiring "treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment"); see also infra note 95-99 and accompanying text.
65 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 403 (observing that the NAFTA's provisions on performance requirements represented 
"a substantial departure from language that had appeared in prior BIT models"); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 237-
38 (explaining that while performance requirements increase the value of foreign investment to the host state, they are thought 
to distort trade flows).
66 
  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1106(1).
68 
  Id. Unlike the provisions on national treatment and MFN treatment, Article 1106(1) does not extend coverage to measures 
imposed in connection with the "sale or other disposition of investments." Compare id. Art. 1102(1)-(2), and Art. 1103(1)-(2), with 
Art. 1106(1); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 403 (observing that Article 1106(1) "does not prohibit the imposition of 
performance requirements in connection with the sale or other disposition of an investment").
69 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1106(3).
70 
  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1106(5).
72 
  Id. Art. 1110(1)-(6).
73 
  Id. Art. 1110(2); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 507 (recognizing that "NAFTA contains unique language" 
expressly identifying going concern value as a means of determining market value, and stating that the United States has long 
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award restitution, they must give states parties the option of paying monetary damages plus interest in lieu of 
 [*159]  restitution.  105 Thus, tribunals have no power to enjoin treaty violations,  106 to declare that states must 
withdraw offending measures,  107 or to award punitive damages even for the most egregious violations.  108
C. Phase Three: The 1994 US. Model BIT
In 1994, the United States revised its Model BIT based on experience gained in the process of negotiating NAFTA's 
investment chapter.   109 However, because it represented an integral part of a broader constellation of 
undertakings relating to trade in goods,   110 government procurement,   111 trade in services (including 
telecommunications and financial services),   112 competition policy,   113 and intellectual property,   114 the drafters 
of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT did not seek to replicate NAFTA's investment chapter.   115 To the contrary, they took 
previous U.S. Model BITs as their foundation, and sought to introduce certain refinements developed during the 
process of negotiating NAFTA,   116 and subsequently identified as appropriate for use in the more limited context 
of treaties aimed only at investor protection, as opposed to the formation of trading blocks.   117
Turning to the 1994 U.S. Model BIT's section on definitions, one sees the abandonment of NAFTA's closed-list 
approach and the restoration of the all-encompassing definition of investments to include "every kind of investment 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly" by an investor of the other party, followed by an illustrative list of six 
examples, which include a company, equity and debt interests in a company, certain contractual rights (such as 
turnkey contracts, construction contracts, concessions and similar contracts), tangible and intangible property, 
intellectual property (not expressly defined to include goodwill this time), and rights conferred pursuant to law, such 
as licenses and permits.   118 As observed elsewhere,   119 the illustrative list omitted a particularly broad example 
of investment that had appeared in the 1984 U.S. Model BIT,  [*160]  namely: "a claim to money or a claim to 
performance having economic value, and associated with an investment."   120 However, according to one source, 
this omission arguably had no effect because the all-encompassing definition already applied to "every kind of 
investment."   121 Also, the examples relating to certain contracts, licenses, and permits likely encompassed the 
treated going concern value as an appropriate method of valuation, but explaining that "some developing countries" have 
resisted the use of going concern value as a method of valuation); cf. SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 487 (indicating that book 
value represents the tool most often used for valuing property, and that book value "was widely used in the petroleum 
nationalizations that took place in the 1970s).
74 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1110(4)-(5).
75 
  See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 731 (1993) (describing investor-state dispute settlement under NAFTA as "one of the key 
achievements of the investment chapter"); see also Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and 
Free Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L, ECON. L. 451, 464 (2003) ("The most 
significant innovation of NAFTA Chapter 11 is that it allows an investor from one NAFTA Party to directly sue another NAFTA 
Party in which that investor has an investment").
76 
 Price, supra note 75, at 731; see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 289 (observing that NAFTA's investment chapter 
represents the first treaty between two developed states providing investor-state arbitration).
77 
  See Horacio Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1073, 1163-68 (1996) (describing 
the three different dispute-settlement mechanisms established by Chapters 11, 19, and 20 of the NAFTA).
78 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1120(1)(a)-(b).
79 
  Id. Art. 1120(1)(c).
80 
 Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes--Adoption, Adaptation and NAFTA Leadership, 54 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1346 n.40 (2006); Todd Weiler, Foreign Investment Law and the United States: You Can't Tell the 
Players Without a Scorecard, 37 INT'L LAW. 279, 282 n.23 (2003).
81 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1120(2).
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chief examples of situations involving "claims to money or claims to performance having economic value, and 
associated with an investment."   122
Turning to substantive disciplines, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT incorporates a number of refinements drawn from 
NAFTA's investment chapter, but also omits or scales back on other refinements found in NAFTA's investment 
chapter. For example, whereas Chapter 11 had extended the guarantees of national treatment and MFN treatment 
to both investments and investors,   123 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT returned to previous formulations in which states 
parties made those undertakings only with respect to investments.   124 With respect to investments, however, the 
1994 U.S. Model BIT followed NAFTA's lead by applying the guarantees of national treatment and MFN treatment 
to virtually all phases of the investment lifecycle, including establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of covered investments.   125
Alongside the guarantees of national treatment and MFN treatment, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT includes an 
undertaking to provide fair and equitable treatment.   126 Like NAFTA and the 1984 U.S. Model BIT,   127 this 
undertaking extends only to investments (and not also to investors).   128 As in the 1984 U.S. Model BIT, the states 
parties undertook to provide covered investments fair and equitable treatment "at all times."   129 Contrary to 
NAFTA,   130 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT does not explicitly yoke the concept of fair and equitable treatment back to 
international law.   131
With respect to performance requirements, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT again incorporates some of NAFTA's 
refinements, but scales back on others. For  [*161]  example, consistent with NAFTA Chapter 11,   132 the 1994 
U.S. Model BIT includes a fairly extensive list of six requirements that host states could not enforce as conditions 
for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of covered investments.   133 
These include requirements to achieve a given level of domestic content, to limit imports of products or services, to 
achieve a particular level of export performance, to limit sales of products or services in the host state (thereby 
essentially requiring exports instead), to transfer technology, or to perform research and development in the host 
82 
  Id. Art. 1120(1).
83 
  Id. Art. 1119.
84 
 Mark Clodfelter, U.S. State Department Participation in International Economic Dispute Resolution, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1273, 
1278-79 (2001); Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 312-13.
85 
  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
86 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1121(1)(b), 1121(2)(b); Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 312.
87 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1121(1)(b), 1121(2)(b).
88 
  Id. Art. 1124(1)-(2).
89 
  Id. Art. 1126(2).
90 
  Id. Art. 1126(2), (5).
91 
  Id.; VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 658.
92 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1128.
93 
  See Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction 188-89 (Jan. 28, 2008).
94 
  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, NAFTA Chapter 11, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 465, 
517 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) (describing the effect of Article 1128 submissions as "an open question," recalling Mexico's 
assertion that they qualify as a subsequent agreement or practice under the Vienna Convention, but stating that tribunals "have 
taken a slightly more cautious view").
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state.   134 Unlike Chapter 11,   135 however, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT does not prohibit states parties from 
imposing such requirements as conditions on the receipt of an advantage,   136 such as tax holidays.   137 In other 
words, while hosts states could not force investors to accept performance requirements as a condition for making 
investments, they could pay investors to accept the same conditions.   138 When one views the differing purposes of 
NAFTA and of BITs, the scaled-back emphasis on performance requirements in BITs makes sense. As part of a 
treaty that primarily addresses trade in goods,   139 NAFTA' s investment chapter understandably aspires to 
eliminate performance requirements likely to disrupt trade in goods.   140 By contrast, because BITs only seek to 
protect foreign investment and make no attempt to regulate trade in goods, the drafters of those instruments limit 
the emphasis on performance requirements to those areas most likely to disrupt cross-border investment, as 
opposed to trade in goods.   141
 [*162]  Turning to expropriation, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT largely reproduces the substance of the corresponding 
provisions of Chapter 11, though often stating the relevant principles more concisely. 142 For example, on the 
measure of compensation, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT used the following, tightly worded paragraph as a replacement 
for three separate paragraphs in NAFTA's investment chapter:
Compensation shall be paid without delay; be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriatory action was taken ("the date of expropriation"); and be fully realizable and 
freely transferable. The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the 
expropriatory action had become known before the date of expropriation.   143
The 1994 U.S. Model BIT's provisions on expropriation also contain some departures from NAFTA. For example, 
when discussing exchange rates for compensation, NAFTA's investment chapter distinguishes between G7 
currencies and other currencies.   144 By contrast, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT distinguishes between currencies that 
are "freely usable," and those that are not.   145 Perhaps more significantly, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT omits any 
mention of valuation criteria, such as "going concern value,"   146 which appears in NAFTA and has been regarded 
as an important recognition of valuation criteria that favor investors.   147
95 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1131(2).
96 
 Notes of Interpretation of Certain NAFTA Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
97 
 Charles H. Brower II, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 347, 353-56, 358-63 (2006); Charles H. Brower II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the Law of State Immunity, 
20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 925-26 (2005); Charles H. Brower II, Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 




  See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, in TREATY 
INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON 129, 148 (Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010) ("This method is efficient but has a serious drawback. . . . It is obvious that a mechanism whereby 
a party to a dispute is able to influence the outcome of judicial proceedings, by issuing official interpretation to the detriment of 
the other party, is incompatible with principles of a fair procedure and is hence undesirable.").
100 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Arts. 1116(1), 1117(2).
101 
  Compare 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 6(1), with NAFTA, supra note 55, Arts. 1116(1)(a), 1117(1)(a); see also 
VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 655.
102 
 Waste Mgmt. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award P 73 (Apr. 30, 2004).
103 
  See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
104 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1135(1).
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Rounding out the substantive disciplines, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT mirrors NAFTA's omission of an umbrella 
clause.   148 As explained below, the United States did not necessarily object to investor-state arbitration of certain 
disputes involving state contracts.   149 To the contrary, the omission of an umbrella clause appears to reflect the 
facts that (1) by the mid-1990s, the United States was engaged in a multilateral negotiation relating to the protection 
of foreign investment, and (2) U.S. negotiators developed a concern that investors and tribunals might come to see 
umbrella clauses as incorporating obligations under other treaties affecting the protection of foreign investment.   
150
 [*163]  Concluding with the dispute-settlement provisions of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, one finds the sharpest 
departures from NAFTA. Consistent with past BIT practice,   151 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT provides few details on 
dispute settlement. As in past BITs,   152 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT authorized arbitration of investment claims under 
the ICSID Convention and the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID.   153 Consistent with NAFTA's investment chapter,   
154
 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT gives investors the further option of arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules.   155 
Consistent with past U.S. BIT practice (but contrary to NAFTA),   156 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT defines investment 
disputes to include claims for violations of the BIT, investment agreements with national authorities, and investment 
authorizations.   157 In other words, investors may seek arbitration not only for alleged treaty violations, but also for 
violations of certain contractual and regulatory undertakings made by the host state. However, unlike its 1984 
counterpart, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT narrowly defines investment agreements only to include written agreements 
with national authorities that grant "rights with respect to natural resources or other assets controlled by national 
authorities."   158
Consistent with past U.S. BIT practice,   159 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT discourages pursuit of local remedies in the 
sense that initial recourse to "the courts or administrative tribunals" of the host state generally extinguishes the right 
to demand arbitration of investment disputes.   160 However, partially incorporating one of NAFTA's refinements,   
161
 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT holds open the possibility for investors to seek certain extraordinary relief from the host 
state's courts and administrative tribunals before or during the arbitration proceedings.   162 But, whereas NAFTA's 
105 
  Id. Art. 1135(1)(b).
106 
  Id. Art. 1134.
107 
  See Bjorklund, supra note 94, at 523 (indicating that NAFTA excludes awards of declaratory relief and specific 
performance).
108 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1135(3).
109 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 102; Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 285.
110 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, chs. 3-8.
111 
  Id. ch. 10.
112 
  Id. chs. 12-14.
113 
  Id. ch. 15.
114 
  Id. ch. 17.
115 




  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 389 (indicating that "the 1994 model gave the U.S. BIT negotiators an opportunity to 
refine the NAFTA language and to place it in an instrument that addressed solely investment-related issues").
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investment chapter permits investors to seek any form of injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not 
involving a claim for damages,   163 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT permitted recourse to the host state's courts only for 
interim injunctive relief and only for the purpose of the preservation of rights and interests pending an award.   164 
Consistent with the requirement for investors to elect remedies, the 1994 U.S. Model BIT does not incorporate both 
of NAFTA's waiting periods for submitting  [*164]  disputes to arbitration.   165 To the contrary, the 1994 U.S. model 
BIT only requires a single, three-month pause between the date on which a dispute arises and the date of 
submission to arbitration.   166
Also consistent with previous U.S. BIT practice,  167 the 1994 U.S. Model BIT makes no attempt to regulate the 
arbitration proceedings, to streamline the arbitration process, to assist and to guide tribunals in the elaboration of 
substantive principles, or to control exposure to liability. Thus, one finds no provisions designating an appointing 
authority,  168 establishing mechanisms for consolidation of proceedings,  169 establishing a right of submissions by 
non-disputing states parties,  170 recognizing the power of states parties to adopt binding interpretations,  171 
imposing statutes of limitations,  172 or limiting the scope of remedies available in arbitration.  173
D. Phase Four: The 2004 U.S. Model BIT
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a combination of three factors produced a substantial shift in U.S. BIT 
practice. First, starting in 1998, a number of Canadian investors brought claims against the United States under 
NAFTA's investment chapter.   174 Although the United States has a perfect record in defending investment treaty 
claims,   175 certain claims against the United States  [*165]  have placed very substantial amounts in controversy.   
176
 Several cases involved sensitive issues, such as environmental regulation,   177 preservation of sacred places 
for indigenous peoples,   178 buy-local requirements,   179 and the integrity of state court proceedings.   180 At least 
one claim had sufficient merit to create a real prospect of liability,   181 though the United States maintained its 
unblemished record based on a technicality.   182 To the North and South, however, Canada and Mexico lost a 
handful of high-profile cases during this period.   183 In this context, public discourse came to reflect a sense of 
118 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, Art. 1(d), reprinted in VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 817.
119 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 121.
120 
  Compare 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 30, Art. 1(b), with 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 1(d).
121 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 1(d); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 120 (indicating that changes to 
the illustrative list do not affect the substance of the definition, "which embraces 'every kind of investment'").
122 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 121.
123 
  See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
124 




  Id. Art. 2(3)(a).
127 
  See supra notes 38, 63 and accompanying text.
128 




  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 2(3)(a).
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *163
Page 16 of 58
 
outrage against the use of corporate  [*166]  claims to challenge the regulatory policies of host states,   184 and the 
states parties to NAFTA themselves slipped into a state of near panic at the prospect of liability.   185
While NAFTA represented (and continues to represent) the only source of investment treaty claims against the 
United States, the MFN provision of NAFTA's investment chapter raised the probability that NAFTA investors would 
invoke any more favorable provisions in BITs subsequently concluded by the United States.   186 Faced with that 
sobering possibility (on top of the concerns already raised by NAFTA claims then pending against Canada, Mexico 
and the United States), the United States initiated a review of its BIT practice and ceased all BIT negotiations as of 
autumn 1999.   187
Contemporaneously, a second factor contributed to a substantial shift in U.S. BIT practice. By late 2000, the United 
States had begun negotiations for FTAs with Singapore and Chile.   188 Because expectations clustered around 
NAFTA as the benchmark for FTAs with the United States,   189 the investment chapters of the U.S.-Singapore and 
U.S.-Chile agreements drew heavily from NAFTA's investment chapter.   190 Because the United States quickly 
opened negotiations for additional FTAs with Australia, Colombia, Morocco, Panama, and Peru,   191 and because 
their investment chapters tended to follow the same mode1,   192 the United States reached a point where its 
investment treaty practice seemed likely to split into two distinct branches, with BITs and FTAs having 
inconsistencies on matters of both substance and procedure.   193 Given the ubiquitous guarantee of MFN 
treatment,   194 and the enthusiasm of investors to use MFN provisions to access the more favorable provisions of 
subsequent treaties,   195 U.S. BIT negotiators concluded that the time had come to align BIT practice with the 
country's faster-moving and more significant FTA practice.   196
Just as U.S. negotiators resolved to harmonize BIT practice with FTA practice, a third factor came into play. In 
2002, Congress adopted the Bipartisan  [*167]  Trade Promotion Authority Act ("TPA"), which established a number 
of objectives for U.S. FTA negotiations.   197 These included a stronger commitment to national treatment and a 
greater emphasis on suppression of performance requirements,   198 as well as instructions to develop clearer 
132 
  See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
133 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 6; see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 389 (stating that the "list of 
prohibited performance requirements was considerably lengthened" to include "six categories").
134 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 6; see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 390 (noting that restrictions on local 
sales "would have the same effect as requiring exports").
135 
  See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
136 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 6.
137 




  See James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH L. REV. 421, 433 (2011) (indicating 
that "NAFTA was primarily intended to liberalize trade in goods"); John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 
AM. J. INT'L L. 429, 429 (2006) (opining that "NAFTA primarily concerns trade in goods and services").
140 
  See Patricia McKinstry Robin, Comment, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. 
L. REV. 931, 949 n.125 (1984) ("Some commentators believe that performance requirements are 'the most serious non-tariff 
distortion to international trade') (quoting THE LABOR-INDUSTRY COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 26 (1981)).
141 
  See Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 29 (2009) (noting that "[o]nly some investment 
agreements prohibit performance requirements"); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 389 (indicating that "the 1994 
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linkages between substantive disciplines and U.S. constitutional principles, particularly with respect to expropriation 
and fair and equitable treatment,   199 so that foreign investors in the United States would not receive more 
favorable treatment than U.S. investors in the United States.   200
TPA's negotiating objectives also included certain improvements to investor-state arbitration, such as more 
expeditious appointment of arbitrators.   201 development of mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims,   202 
exploration of an appellate mechanism to facilitate the development of coherent jurisprudence,   203 a greater 
commitment to transparency as demonstrated by requirements for timely publication of submissions and decisions,   
204
 opening hearings to the public,   205 and creation of mechanisms for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions 
from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations.   206
Based on the coincidence of circumstances just discussed, the United States adopted a new Model BIT in 2004 that 
sought to achieve three objectives: (1) to address concerns that had arisen in claims under NAFTA's investment 
chapter; (2) to eliminate inconsistencies between U.S. BIT and FTA practice; and (3) to satisfy the negotiating 
objectives established by TPA.   207
Starting with the definition of investment, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT adopts and refines the all-encompassing 
formulation used in previous BITs (but not in NAFTA).   208 Thus, it defines investment to mean "every asset that an 
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment."   209 Unlike previous 
texts, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT defines the characteristics of an investment to include "the commitment of capital," 
"the expectation of gain or profit," and "the assumption of risk."   210 As in previous BITs (but not in NAFTA),   211 
the 2004 U.S. Model BIT sets forth an illustrative list of investments  [*168]  that include familiar examples such as 
an enterprise, equity interests in an enterprise, debt interests in an enterprise (including long-term loans), certain 
contracts (including turnkey, construction, and concession agreements), intellectual property rights (now omitting 
any illustrative examples), certain licenses and permits, as well as tangible and intangible property rights.   212 In 
addition, the illustrative list includes futures, options and derivatives.   213 By contrast, it expressly excludes "an 
order or judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action."   214 This new exclusion seems puzzling because 
model gave the U.S. BIT negotiators an opportunity to refine the NAFTA language and to place it in an instrument that 
addressed solely investment-related issues").
142 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 477 ("Numerous changes were made to the language of the expropriation provision, 
though generally without affecting the substance").
143 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 3(2). Compare id. with NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1110(2), (3), (6).
144 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1110(4)-(5).
145 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 3(3)-(4).
146 
  Id. Art. 3(2).
147 
  See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
148 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 261.
149 
  See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
150 
 VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 261.
151 
  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
152 
  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
153 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(3)(i)-(ii).
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the 1984 U.S. Model BIT had defined investments to include at least certain claims to money,   215 and if that basic 
insight remains valid, it seems hard to understand why the merger of a claim into a judgment or order should affect 
its status as an investment.   216
Turning to substantive disciplines, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT strengthens the guarantees of national and MFN 
treatment, as well as the prohibition of performance requirements. Thus, as in NAFTA (but not previous BITs),   217 
the 2004 Model U.S. BIT extends the guarantees of national treatment and MFN treatment to both investments and 
investors at virtually every stage of the investment process, including the acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.   218
Likewise, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT prohibits host states from imposing any of the following as conditions to 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation or sale or other disposition of an 
investment: requirements to (1) achieve a particular level of export performance; (2) achieve a given level of 
domestic content; (3) purchase goods or services locally; (4) relate imports to exports; (5) restrict sales of goods or 
services in the host state; (6) transfer technology for use in the host state; or (7) to supply goods and services to 
regional and global markets exclusively from the host state.   219 In addition, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT departs from 
past BIT practice,   220 and more closely approximates NAFTA,   221 by prohibiting states parties from conditioning 
the receipt of an advantage on requirements to: (1) achieve a given level of domestic content; (2) source goods in 
the host state; (3) relate the value of imports to the value of exports; or (4) restrict sales of goods to services in the 
host state.   222
However, in addressing fair and equitable treatment and expropriation, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT adopts 
formulations designed to limit the discretion of tribunals, to preserve the regulatory discretion of states parties, and 
thus to restrict  [*169]  their exposure to liability.   223 Thus, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT yokes the guarantee of "fair 
and equitable treatment" back to customary international law,   224 expressly stipulating that the provision 
"prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens,"   225 does "not require 
155 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(3)(iii).
156 
  See supra notes 49, 101 and accompanying text.
157 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(1).
158 
  Id. Art. 1(h); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 591 (explaining that "[n]o sectoral limitations had appeared in prior 
models").
159 
  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
160 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(2)(a), 9(3)(a).
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  See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
162 
 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(3)(b).
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  See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118, Art. 9(3)(b).
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  See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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treatment in addition to or beyond" that required by custom,   226 and does not incorporate treaty standards set forth 
in the BIT or in other international agreements.   227
In addition, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes an annex confirming the understanding that customary international 
law results from the general and consistent practice of states performed out of a sense of obligation.   228 Factual 
proof of those elements often places insurmountable burdens on claimants.   229
However, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT identifies one requirement imposed by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment, and ties it back to U.S. legal principles. Thus, the text recognizes that 'fair and equitable 
treatment' includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world."   230
 [*170]  Likewise, while the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes a provision on expropriation that closely follows its 
antecedents in NAFTA and the 1994 U.S. Model BIT,   231 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT also includes an annex that 
confirms certain understandings regarding the scope and definition of expropriations.   232 For example, the annex 
states that measures cannot constitute expropriations unless they interfere with a "tangible or intangible property 
right or property interest in an investment."   233 Drafters presumably intended this qualification to forestall 
arguments that destruction and loss of market share constitute an expropriation.   234 In addition, the annex clarifies 
that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations."   235 Finally, the annex clarifies that assessments of indirect expropriations involve a "case-
by case, fact-based inquiry" that focuses on three factors normally associated with U.S. constitutional jurisprudence 
on takings.   236 These are: (1) the economic impact of the government action; (2) the extent to which that action 
interferes with reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action.   237 
Application of these factors should tend to increase the probability that claims for indirect expropriation will produce 
168 
  See Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 309 (noting that the "1994 model left the method of tribunal formation to the 
applicable arbitral rules").
169 
  Id. at 310.
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  See id. at 296-98 (identifying certain provisions that might enhance the opportunities for states parties to express views, or 





  Id. at 313.
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  See id. at 301 (observing that the "1994 model was silent concerning the remedies that an investor-state tribunal could 
award").
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Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID REv.-FILJ 344, 347 (2004); Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID 
Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 444, 461 (2006); Yadullah 
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2016, available at 
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results that generally coincide with a range of outcomes that one might expect under U.S. takings jurisprudence.   
238
 [*171]  Turning to provisions on dispute settlement, one finds continuity in the sense that the 2004 U.S. Model BIT 
repeats the practice of allowing investors to pursue arbitration under the ICSID Convention, ICSID's Additional 
Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for claims alleging a violation of the BIT's substantive disciplines, 
investment agreements, and investment authorizations.   239 Unlike its predecessor,   240 however, the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT defines investment agreements more broadly to include written undertakings that grant rights in three 
economic sectors: (1) natural resources that the government controls; (2) supply of public services such as power, 
water or telecommunications on behalf of the host state; and (3) infrastructure projects such as construction of 
roads, bridges, canals, dams or pipelines that are not exclusively or primarily for government use.   241
Moving beyond the general undertaking to arbitrate investment disputes, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT's dispute 
settlement provisions reflect a dramatic shift in U.S. BIT practice,   242 as well as the reason why the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT triples in length when compared to the 1994 U.S. Model BIT.   243 Simply put, whereas previous U.S. 
Model BITs had barely sought to regulate the arbitration process,   244 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT incorporated most 
of NAFTA's procedural refinements,   245 as well as those identified by Congress as negotiating objectives in TpA.   
246
 Thus, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes refinements designed to encourage the pursuit of alternative remedies 
and local remedies, to streamline the arbitration process, to enhance transparency, to guide and to regulate the 
arbitrators' decisions, and to limit the host state's exposure to liability.
Like NAFTA,   247 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes a number of provisions designed to encourage the pursuit of 
alternative dispute settlement and local remedies. In this context, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes a new provision 
admonishing (but not requiring) investors to seek resolution of investment disputes through consultation and 
negotiation.   248 To facilitate consultation and negotiation, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT adopts two waiting periods 
drawn from  [*172]  NAFTA' s investment chapter.   249 First, before submitting claims to arbitration, investors must 
176 
  See Statement of Claim, Methanex Corp. v. United States at 13 (Dec. 3, 1999) (seeking $ 970 million in damages); Notice of 
Claim, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States P 187 (Oct. 30, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3922.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (seeking $ 750 million in damages).
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 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (June 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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 ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award (Jan. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
180 
 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 12, 2002),available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf (Mar. 22, 
2016).
181 
  See Loewen, supra note 180, PP 119, 137 (finding that "by any standard of measurement," a trial conducted by a 
Mississippi state court was a "disgrace" that also violated the minimum standard of treatment required by customary 
international law).
182 
  See id. PP 217, 237 (dismissing the case because the investor did not exhaust judicial remedies by filing a petition for 
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and because the Canadian investor went into bankruptcy and reorganized as a 
U.S. company, thereby losing the Canadian nationality that gave it standing to assert claims against the United States under 
NAFTA' s investment chapter).
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *170
Page 21 of 58
 
wait for six months following the events said to give rise to their claims.   250 Second, they must give written notice 
of intent to bring claims 90 days before actually submitting their claims to arbitration.   251
Like NAFTA,   252 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT also encourages pursuit of local remedies by allowing investors to have 
first recourse to the host state's courts or administrative tribunals and then, to pursue arbitration, provided that they 
waive in writing the right to continue any other dispute settlement processes relating to the measure(s) alleged to 
violate the treaty, investment agreement or investment authorization.   253 Like NAFTA, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT 
further encourages pursuit of local remedies by exempting from the waiver proceedings seeking certain 
extraordinary relief from the host state's judicial and administrative tribunals.   254 However, unlike NAFTA, the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT does not permit the continuation of local actions seeking declaratory or permanent injunctive relief 
against the host state.   255 To the contrary, it only permits actions that seek interim injunctive relief, not involving 
the payment of damages, and only for the purpose of preserving rights and interests during the pendency of the 
arbitral proceedings.   256
Turning to provisions designed to streamline the arbitration process, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes a new 
requirement for investors to identify their party-appointed arbitrators when submitting notices of arbitration.   257 Like 
NAFTA,   258 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT designates the Secretary-General of ICSID as the  [*173]  appointing 
authority for arbitration proceedings.   259 However, whereas NAFTA had empowered the incumbent to fill 
vacancies remaining 90 days after submission of a claim to arbitration,   260 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT reduces that 
time period to 75 days.   261
As under NAFTA,   262 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT permits consolidation of two or more arbitrations having a common 
question of law or fact.   263 However, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT adds a requirement that the consolidated claims 
"arise out of the same events or circumstances."   264 Like NAFTA,   265 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT requires disputing 
parties to submit requests for consolidation to the Secretary-General of ICSID.   266 However, the 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT gives the incumbent 30 days to deny a "manifestly unfounded" request for consolidation.   267 As under NAFTA,   
183 
 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-review-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. 
Canada, Award in Respect of Damages (May 31, 2002),available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/pope-phase-36.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (Dec. 16. 2002), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 
2016); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000),available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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268
 consolidation tribunals operate under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.   269 However, unlike NAFTA,   270 the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT contemplates that the claimants (collectively) and the host state will each have the opportunity 
to appoint one member of the consolidation tribunal.   271
Consistent with the negotiating objectives set forth in TPA,   272 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT also streamlines the 
arbitration process by giving respondent states the right to seek preliminary determinations that claims either fail as 
a matter of lavv,   273 or do not fall within the tribunal's competence.   274 An application on either ground suspends 
proceedings on the merits.   275 For expedited applications involving either of the preliminary determinations just 
mentioned, tribunals generally have 150 days to issue their decisions.   276
Perhaps bridging the topics of streamlining and transparency, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT gives the disputing parties a 
right to insist that tribunals circulate drafts of decisions or awards on liability, in which case the disputing parties 
 [*174]  receive 60 days to comment on "any aspect of the proposed decision or award," and tribunals receive an 
additional 45 days following expiration of the comment period to issue their decisions or awards in final form.   277
Turning to provisions that tend to promote transparency, consistent with the negotiating goals set forth in TPA,   278 
the 2004 U.S. Model BIT authorizes tribunals to accept amicus curiae submissions, although it does not identify any 
criteria for accepting or rejecting such submissions.   279 Also consistent with the negotiating objectives set forth in 
TPA,   280 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT requires respondent states to make key documents available to the public in 
every proceeding.   281 These include the notice of intent, the notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials, briefs, 
amicus submissions, submissions by non-disputing states parties, transcripts of hearings, as well as orders, awards 
and decisions of the tribunal.   282 The 2004 U.S. Model BIT further requires tribunals to conduct public hearings.   
283
Turning to provisions that empower states parties to assist and to guide tribunals in the elaboration of norms, the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT gives the non-disputing state party a right to make submissions regarding the interpretation of 
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the BIT.   284 In a slight departure from NAFTA, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT expressly specifies that this includes the 
right to make both written and oral submissions.   285 As under NAFTA's investment chapter,   286 the states parties 
have the right to adopt binding understandings of BIT provisions.   287 However, in another departure from NAFTA, 
the formulation of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT leaves no room for tribunals or observers to question whether the states 
parties have exceeded the legitimate scope of interpretation.   288 Thus, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT provides that a 
"joint decision of the [states parties] . . . declaring their interpretation. . . shall be binding on a tribunal, and any 
decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision."   289
Like NAFTA, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes a handful of provisions designed to limit the states parties' exposure 
to liability. First, as under NAFTA,   290 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT adopts a three-year statute of limitations.   291  
 [*175]  Unlike NAFTA, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT expressly designates timely submission of claims as a condition on 
consent to arbitration.   292 Second, as under NAFTA,   293 the 2004 U.S. Model BIT limits tribunals to awarding 
monetary damages or restitution.   294 In the event that tribunals award restitution, they must give states parties the 
option of paying monetary damages in lieu of restitution.   295 Thus, tribunals have no power to enjoin treaty 
violations,   296 or to declare that states must withdraw offending measures. As in NAFTA,   297 the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT excludes awards of punitive damages even for the most egregious treaty violations.   298 Also as in 
NAFTA, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT affirms that the limitation on remedies does not affect the power of tribunals to 
award costs and fees in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules.   299
Following a lengthy interagency process and public consultations that began in 2009, the United States adopted a 
new Model BIT in 2012.   300 While introducing new requirements with respect to transparency in the promulgation 
and application of regulations by host states,   301 and in the host state's enforcement of its own environmental and 
labor laws,   302 the 2012 U.S. Model BIT only provides for state-to-state dispute settlement of controversies 
regarding  [*176]  obligations with respect to transparency.   303 For disputes involving obligations with respect to 
the enforcement of environmental and labor laws, the 2012 U.S. Model BIT only provides for state-to-state 
consultations.   304 With respect to the definition of covered investments, the 2012 US. Model BIT clarifies that a 
208 
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state's territory includes its territorial sea, as well as areas of the high seas where it can exercise jurisdiction under 
customary international law.   305 Originally drawn from NAFTA,   306 the substance of this definition already 
appeared in several U.S. FTAs,   307 and may be particularly useful for protection of investments in offshore oil and 
gas projects.   308 With respect to substantive disciplines, the 2012 U.S. Model BIT adds almost no refinements,   
309
 except a slight expansion of the  [*177]  prohibition on performance requirements to include those that require 
the use of local technology.   310 The dispute-settlement provisions in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT do not include any 
substantial changes.   311 Given the exceedingly small number of changes, observers generally do not regard the 
2012 U.S. Model BIT as representing a new or separate phase in the development of U.S. investment treaty 
practice.   312
II. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
In October 2015, the United States concluded negotiations on TPP with eleven other Pacific Rim states, namely 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.   313 
Collectively, the twelve states parties to TPP account for one-third of global trade,   314 40% of global GDP,   315 
and over a trillion dollars in cross-border investment.   316 As of 2011, annual outward flows of foreign direct 
investment ("FDI") from the United States to other TPP states totaled $ 83 billion, whereas inward flows of FDI from 
 [*178]  other TPP states to the United States totaled $ 61 billion.   317 The total existing stock of outward FDI from 
the United States to other TPP states amounted to $ 843 billion, whereas the existing stock of inward FDI from 
other TPP states to the United States amounted to $ 596 billion.   318
Upon ratification and entry into force, TPP will liberalize trade by removing barriers to trade in goods.   319 In 
addition to a chapter generally dealing with trade in goods,   320 TPP has separate chapters on rules of origin,   321 
textiles and apparel,   322 customs administration,   323 and trade remedies (such as antidumping duties and 
countervailing duties).   324 TPP also has separate chapters on particular non-tariff barriers, including sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures,   325 as well as technical barriers to trade.   326 Looking beyond trade in goods, TPP has 
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BIT).
224 
  Compare NAFTA Art. 1105(1), with 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 5(1).
225 




  Id. Art. 5(3).
228 
  Id Annex A.
229 
 One tribunal candidly described the difficulties of proving changes in customary international law:
602. The Tribunal acknowledges that it is difficult to establish a change in customary international law. As Respondent 
explains, establishment of a rule of customary international law requires: (1) "a concordant practice of a number of States 
acquiesced in by others," and (2) "a conception that the practice is required by or consistent with the prevailing law (opinio 
juris)."
603. The evidence of such "concordant practice" undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation is exhibited in very few 
authoritative sources: treaty ratification language, statements of governments, treaty practice (e.g., Model BITs), and 
sometimes pleadings. Although one can readily identify the practice of States, it is usually very difficult to determine the 
intent behind those actions. Looking to a claimant to ascertain custom requires it to ascertain such intent, a complicated 
and particularly difficult task. In the context of arbitration, however, it is necessarily Claimant's place to establish a change 
in custom.
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chapters relating to other forms of cross-border economic relations, including investment,   327   [*179]  services,   
328
 financial services,   329 telecommunications,   330 and electronic commerce.   331
TPP also includes separate chapters on cross-cutting topics like temporary entry for business persons,   332 
government procurement,   333 regulation of state-owned enterprises,   334 and protection of intellectual property.   
335
 Likewise, TPP includes chapters on important social policies, including protection of labor and the environment,   
336
 as well as the promotion of regulatory transparency,   337 all of which impose binding obligations subject to 
enforcement through state-to-state dispute settlement.   338 TPP also addresses other social policies like 
anticorruption laws,   339 competition laws,   340 and principles of regulatory coherence,   341 but only contemplates 
state-to-state consultations for controversies regarding the implementation of those norms.   342
Finally, TPP incorporates a number of chapters that seek to facilitate implementation by states parties in a diligent 
and cooperative manner that also show particular sensitivity to the interests of smaller stakeholders, including 
smaller states parties and commercial enterprises. Thus, one finds chapters on cooperation and capacity building,   
343
 development,   344 small and medium-sized businesses,   345 as well as chapters requiring periodic review of 
the effects of TPP on regional and national competitiveness,   346 periodic reporting on the implementation of norms 
during negotiated transition periods,   347 and binding dispute settlement through state-to-state arbitration for 
controversies regarding most undertakings other than TPP's investment chapter,   348 for which investor-state 
arbitration represents the primary mode of dispute settlement.   349   [*180]  Focusing on TPP's investment chapter, 
one finds an exceedingly close resemblance to the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. In fact, the extent of the resemblance 
makes it possible to describe TPP's investment chapter by identifying the relatively minor ways in which it departs 
from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. With respect to the definition of investment, TPP does not depart from the text of the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT.   350
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award PP 602-03 (June 8, 2009) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
230 
  See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 5(2)(a). As mentioned above, in adopting TPA, Congress made it a 
negotiating objective to tie fair and equitable treatment back to U.S. legal principles, including the constitutional requirement of 
due process. See supra note 199 and accompanying text; see also  19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (calling on negotiators to 
"establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the 
principle of due process").
231 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 6; see also supra notes 72, 142-43 and accompanying text.
232 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Annex B.
233 
  Id. Annex B(2).
234 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 481 ("This language was inserted in reaction to Pope & Talbot v. Canada, S.D. Myers 
v. Canada, and Methanex v. United State[s], where it had been argued that regulations reducing or eliminating market share 
could constitute an expropriation"); Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 293 ("This language was intended to foreclose 
arguments that certain types of interests in which no property rights exist, such as market share, could be expropriated"). As also 
mentioned above, the United States has argued that NAFTA's investment chapter did not guard against expropriation of goodwill 
inasmuch as goodwill does not constitute a property interest. See supra note 61.
235 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Annex B(4)(b).
236 
  Id. Annex B(4)(a); see also  Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying three factors that 
have "particular significance" in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on takings).
237 
  Id
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Turning to substantive disciplines, TPP includes only a handful of refinements. First, with respect to national 
treatment and MFN treatment, TPP clarifies that a determination of whether comparators are "in like circumstances" 
depends on "the totality of circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between investors 
or investments on the basis of legitimate public welfare objectives."   351 While novel as an express treaty provision, 
this codifies views widely held by tribunals and observers.   352 "For greater certainty," TPP also declares that the 
guarantee of MFN treatment "does not encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, 
such as those included in Section B" of TPP's investment chapter.   353
 [*181]  Second, with respect to the minimum standard of treatment, TPP clarifies that the application of measures 
inconsistent with investors' expectations does not by itself constitute a denial of fair and equitable treatment.   354 
While not absolutely clear, this provision appears to suggest that states do not attract liability merely for 
disappointing the subjective expectations of investors.   355 Observers have opined that this provision may still hold 
open the possibility that states incur liability by violating expectations tied to specific assurances relied on by 
investors when making investments in the host state.   356 TPP also clarifies that the "mere fact" that a state fails to 
issue or renew a subsidy or grant does not violate the minimum standard of treatment.   357 Of course, the failure to 
issue or to renew a subsidy or grant in violation of positive assurances might support the opposite conclusion.   358
Third, with respect to expropriation, TPP similarly clarifies that the decision not to issue or to renew a grant or 
subsidy does not constitute an expropriation, provided that the state has not made any specific commitment under 
law or contract to do so, or provided that the state acts in accordance with any terms or conditions attached to the 
subsidy or grant.   359 In addition, with respect to indirect takings, TPP clarifies that an assessment of interference 
with the investor's reasonable investment-backed expectations must take into account the extent to which the state 
has provided binding written assurances, as well as the general nature and extent of government regulation (or 
potential for government regulation) in the relevant industry.   360 Finally, when emphasizing the point that  [*182]  
non-discriminatory public health regulations rarely constitute indirect expropriations, TPP clarifies that such 
measures include the regulation, pricing, supply of, and reimbursement for pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, vaccines, 
238 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 482 (observing that the use of Supreme Court precedent helped to advance two 
negotiating objectives set forth in TPA, namely (1) ensuring that foreign investors in the United States would not receive greater 
substantive rights than U.S. investors in the United States; and (2) ensuring that U.S. investors abroad would enjoy the same 
sorts of substantive rights that they have under the U.S. Constitution).
239 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 24(1), (3).
240 
  See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
241 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 1.
242 
  See VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 595 ("The 2004 model features a massive revision of the investor-state disputes 
provision").
243 
  Compare 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 118 (encompassing 15 articles and eight pages of text), with 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT, supra note 209 (encompassing 37 articles and 30 pages of text); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 112 (explaining 
that "[m]ost of the additional length. . . resulted from the inclusion of new language relating to investor-state dispute resolution").
244 
  See supra notes 51, 168-73 and accompanying text.
245 
  See supra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
246 
  See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
247 
  See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
248 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 23.
249 
  See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and appliances, as well as blood and blood-
related products.   361
Fourth and finally, TPP prohibits two types of performance requirements not mentioned in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT: 
(1) those that require the use of local technologies or that prevent the purchase and use of particular technologies;   
362
 and (2) those that require the adoption of a given rate or amount of royalty under a license agreement, or that 
require a given duration for a license agreement.   363
Turning to provisions on dispute settlement, TPP generally follows the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. Thus, investors have 
the right to seek arbitration of investment disputes under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules, the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or any other arbitration rules agreed by the disputing parties.   364 Like the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT,   365 TPP defines investment disputes to include claims alleging violations of certain TPP provisions, 
investment agreements, and investment authorizations.   366 However, TPP qualifies both the definition of 
investment agreements and the circumstances under which investors can demand arbitration of disputes arising 
under investment agreements. Like the 2004 U.S. Model BIT,   367 TPP limits the definition of investment 
agreements to three economic sectors: (1) exploitation of natural resources that a national authority controls; (2) 
supply of public utility services on behalf of a state party; and (3) implementation of public infrastructure projects.   
368
 But TPP refines the definition of relevant natural resources to include oil, gas, rare earth minerals, timber, gold, 
iron ore, and similar resources, but not land, water, or radio spectrum.   369 Also, TPP refines the definition of public 
services to exclude correctional services, healthcare services, education services, childcare services, welfare 
services, and other similar social services.   370
For controversies arising under investment agreements, TPP excludes the possibility of arbitration under the treaty 
if investment agreements already provide for arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules, 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICC Arbitration Rules or the LCIA Arbitration Rules.   371 For the exclusion to 
apply to arbitrations not conducted under the IC SID Convention, however, the investment agreement must also 
250 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 24(3).
251 
  Id. Art. 24(2).
252 
  See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
253 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 26(2); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 604-05 (emphasizing that the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT seeks to remove disincentives to submit investment disputes to local remedies in the first instance); 
Vandevelde, Comparison, supra note 28, at 312 (describing this aspect of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT as something that 
"encourages investors to submit disputes to local courts").
254 




 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 26(3).
257 
  Id. Art. 24(6)(a). This provision may have three virtues: (1) accelerating formation of the tribunal; (2) preventing 
gamesmanship by claimants who commence proceedings but wait to nominate their arbitrators until the deadline for tribunal 
formation, thereby denying the host state a reasonable time to make a responsive appointment; and (3) preventing 
gamesmanship by claimants who commence proceedings in order to toll statutes of limitations, but fail to designate an arbitrator, 
thereby avoiding the need to pursue the claim expeditiously. VANDEVELDE, supra note 17, at 602-03; see also Vandevelde, 
Comparison, supra note 28, at 308 (observing that the provision "was expected to expedite tribunal formation").
258 
  See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
259 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 27(2).
260 
  See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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designate a state party  [*183]  to the New York Convention other than the host state as the legal place of 
arbitration.   372 Thus, if the investment agreement does not provide for arbitration, or provides for arbitration under 
a set of rules not mentioned above, or provides for arbitration on the territory of the host state, investors can 
arbitrate disputes involving investment agreements under TPP.   373 But if investors bring claims for violations of 
investment agreements or investment authorizations, TPP expressly authorizes states to bring counterclaims.   374
With respect to provisions designed to encourage the pursuit of alternative dispute settlement and local remedies, 
TPP incorporates two departures from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. Starting with alternative dispute settlement, TPP 
includes a provision that now requires investors to seek consultations with the respondent state and prevents the 
submission of claims to arbitration until six months after the host state has received a request for consultations.   375 
Turning to the pursuit of local remedies, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT encouraged investors to pursue local remedies by 
allowing them to have first recourse to the host state's judicial and administrative tribunals, but still permitting them 
to change course and submit their claims to investor-state arbitration.   376 Under TPP, however, investors with 
treaty claims against Chile, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam will not have that option.   377 They will have to make a 
definitive and exclusive election between local remedies or investor-state arbitration for such claims.   378 Given that 
choice, TPP likely will have the effect of discouraging investors even from experimenting with local remedies for 
treaty claims against those four states.   379
For provisions designed to streamline or improve the arbitration process, TPP includes only a couple of minor 
refinements. These include a requirement that, when exercising their powers to appoint arbitrators, disputing parties 
and the Secretary-General of ICSID take into account the expertise of potential candidates with respect to the 
governing law.   380 In addition, the states parties undertake to  [*184]  provide guidance on a code of conduct for 
arbitrators, as well as guidance on the application of rules and guidelines on conflicts of interest for arbitrators 
before TPP's entry into force.   381
261 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 27(3).
262 
  See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
263 




  See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
266 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 33(2).
267 
  Id. Art. 33(3).
268 
  See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
269 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 33(8).
270 
  See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
271 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 33(4).
272 
  See supra note 202 and accompanying text
273 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 28(4).
274 
  Id. Art. 28(5).
275 
  Id. Art. 28(4)(b), (5).
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In its provisions on transparency, TPP departs from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT only by providing explicit standards for 
the consideration of amicus submissions.   382 Thus, amicus submissions should address a question of fact or law 
falling within the scope of the dispute, should assist the tribunal in evaluating the submissions of the disputing 
parties, and should come from a person or entity that has a "significant interest" in the arbitral proceedings.   383 In 
addition, TPP identifies certain formal requirements for amicus submissions, including identification of the author, 
disclosure of any affiliation with a disputing party, and identification of any source of assistance in preparing the 
submission.   384 Further, submissions must be in the language of the proceedings, and comply with any deadlines 
and page limits set by the tribunal.   385 Finally, the disputing parties must have an opportunity to respond to amicus 
submissions, and the tribunal must ensure that the submissions do not disrupt the proceedings, unduly burden the 
proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any disputing party.   386 While not mentioned in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT,   387 
these requirements generally coincide with existing best practices.   388
While TPP includes no new provisions designed to guide or assist tribunals in the elaboration of norms, it includes a 
number of new or substantially revised provisions designed to limit the liability of states parties. First, consistent 
with the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and other U.S. investment treaties,   389 TPP includes a statute of limitations.   390 
However, TPP extends the time limit to three years and six months from the date on which the claimant acquired, or 
should have acquired, knowledge of breach and damage.   391 While the extended time seems calculated to ensure 
that TPP's introduction of a six-month consultations requirement does not  [*185]  prejudice claimants,   392 the 
provision also delays by six months the point at which states may close their books on liability.
In another subtle limitation on liability, TPP includes a provision emphasizing the burden of proof, particularly in 
regard to claims sounding in the minimum standard of treatment.   393 As mentioned above, the 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT yoked fair and equitable treatment to customary international law and, in an annex, further defined customary 
international law in terms of a consistent and generalized state practice performed out of a sense of legal obligation.   
394
 However, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT did not specify that claimants had to prove the existence of such elements 
276 
  Id. Art. 28(5). If a disputing party requests a hearing on the application, the tribunal may take another 30 days to issue its 
decision. Id. Upon a showing of "extraordinary cause," a tribunal may extend the time for its decision by "an additional brief 
period" not to exceed 30 days. Id.
277 
  Id. Art. 28(9)(a).
278 
  See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
279 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 28(3).
280 
  See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
281 




  Id. Art. 29(2).
284 




  See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
287 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 30(3).
288 
  Compare supra note 95 and accompanying text.
289 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 30(3) (emphasis added).
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as matters of fact in every case. Instead, claimants might arguably rely on the declarations of tribunals and courts to 
the effect that certain principles had gained the status of customary international law.   395
By contrast, TPP includes a provision to the effect that investors who bring claims under TPP's investment chapter 
have "the burden of proving all elements of [their] claims, consistent with general principles of international law 
applicable to international arbitration."   396 In addition, TPP emphasizes that this burden applies to claims involving 
the minimum standard of treatment.   397 Evidently, the provision endorses the approach taken in Glamis Gold v. 
United States, where the tribunal demanded factual proof of consistent and generalized state practice, where the 
tribunal recognized that this placed a very high burden on investors to establish their claims for violation of the 
minimum standard, and where the tribunal held that the investor had not proven any decisive shift in state practice 
since the 1920s, when the minimum standard of treatment only forbade host states from subjecting aliens to 
egregious, outrageous or shocking government conduct.   398
In addition, TPP includes two potentially significant limitations on damages. First, TPP provides that an investor 
"may recover only for loss or damage that it  [*186]  has incurred in its capacity as an investor of a Party."   399 This 
appears to represent the expansion of a concept introduced for expropriation claims in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. As 
mentioned above, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT clarified that the host state's actions cannot constitute expropriations 
unless they interfere with a "tangible or intangible property right or other property interest in an investment."   400 
Observers regard this provision as an effort to neutralize claims that states had expropriated things like export 
markets or export market share, which arguably did not constitute property rights and, in any case, involved "trade" 
losses as opposed to "investment" losses.   401 Likewise, TPP's new limitation on damages seems designed to 
neutralize claims for loss of export markets or other "trade" losses, even for claims not sounding in expropriation. 
Arguably, this provision could have changed the outcome in cases like S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, where a U.S. 
investor prevailed on claims that Canada's ban on cross-border transportation of PCBs violated the guarantees of 
national treatment and MFN treatment because it operated in a discriminatory manner and impaired the value of 
290 
  See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
291 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 26(1).
292 
  Compare NAFTA, supra note 55, Arts. 1116(2), 1117(2), with 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 26(1).
293 
  See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
294 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 34(1).
295 
  Id. Art. 34(1)(b).
296 
  Id. Art. 28(8).
297 
  See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
298 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 34(3).
299 
  Compare NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1135(1), with 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 34(1).
300 
  See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2016) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT];see also Lee M. Caplan & Jeremy Sharpe, United States, in 
COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 755, 755 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) ("The instrument is 
the product of extensive deliberations within the U.S. Government and outreach to Congress and civil society that began in 
2009"); John R. Crook, United States Adopts a New Bilateral Investment Treaty, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, 663 (2012) (quoting 
U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. P2012/611, United States Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Apr. 
20, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188198.htm) (indicating that the review process began in 
February 2009, and involved "extensive input from Congress, companies, business associations, labor groups, environmental 
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S.D. Myers' Canadian affiliate, whose sole business had been to solicit Canadian orders for export and destruction 
of PCBs at facilities in the United States.   402
As a second limitation on damages, TPP formalizes the principle that claimants should only recover out-of-pocket 
costs for cases involving thwarted investments.   403 While tribunals have traditionally applied that limitation,   404 at 
least one recent award included compensation for lost profits amounting to nearly a billion dollars for a thwarted 
investment that had no operating history.   405 Under TPP, thwarted investors would have no opportunity even to 
argue for lost profits.   406
Finally, TPP includes two provisions designed to eliminate investor-state dispute settlement (and thus liability) for 
certain categories of claims. First, TPP  [*187]  allows states to declare that they will deny the benefits of investor-
state dispute arbitration to claims that challenge tobacco control measures.   407 If states have not previously 
elected to deny such benefits, they may do so even following the submission of claims challenging tobacco control 
measures.   408 In such cases, tribunals must terminate the proceedings.   409 Second, TPP includes an annex on 
the treatment of public debt.   410 In that annex, states parties emphasize that the purchase of public debt "entails 
commercial risk," and that tribunals should not issue awards for non-payment unless the particular default also rises 
to the level of a treaty violation, for example a violation of the prohibition on uncompensated takings.   411 Even in 
such cases, however, the annex provides that investors generally cannot pursue treaty claims relating to public debt 
if the situation involves a "negotiated restructuring," meaning that holders of 75% of the aggregate principal amount 
have consented to a debt exchange or other restructuring process.   412 In the event of negotiated restructurings, 
however, investors may still pursue treaty claims alleged to involve the denial of national treatment or MFN 
treatment.   413
III. CONTINUITY
In marketing TPP to Congress and to the public, U.S. trade officials emphasize that TPP does not replicate NAFTA.   
414
 This message seems prudent,  [*188]  given widespread dissatisfaction with NAFTA,   415 and surprisingly 
and other non-governmental organizations, and academics"); Johnson,supra note 175, at 1 (explaining that the United States' 
formal review of its model BIT took three years due to a lengthy process of interagency review and public consultations).
301 
 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 300, Art.11; Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 300, at 757, 803-04; Crook, supra note 300, at 
662; Johnson, supra note 175, at 2-3.
302 
 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 300, Arts. 12-13; Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 300, at 757, 804-07; Crook, supra note 300, 
at 662; Johnson, supra note 175, at 4.
303 
  See 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 300, Art. 24(1)(a)(1)(A), 24(1)(b)(i)(A) (permitting investor-state arbitration for 
breaches of Articles 3 through 10, which necessarily excludes the articles on transparency (Article 11), environment (Article 12), 
and labor (Article 13)); see also id., Art. 37(1) (generally providing for state-to-state arbitration of disputes between the states 
parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty).
304 
  See id. Art. 37(5) (excluding the articles on environment and labor from state-to-state dispute settlement); see also Caplan & 
Sharpe, supra note 300, at 848; Johnson, supra note 175, at 4.
305 
 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 300, Art. 1; Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 300, at 771-72; Paolo Di Rosa, The New 2012 
US. Model BIT: Staying the Course, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 1, 2012), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/06/01/the-new-2012-u-s-model-bit-staying-the-course (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). Although 
this definition of territory appears in a U.S. Model BIT for the first time, it has appeared in certain FTAs concluded by the United 
States. Caplan & Sharpe,supra note 300, at 771 n.71; see also infra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
306 
 NAFTA, supra note 55, Annex 201.1.
307 
 U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, Annex 2.1 (entered into force Oct. 31, 2012), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/panamatpa/final-text (last visited Mar. 25, 2016): U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement, Annex 1.3 (entered into force May 15, 2012),available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
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broad concerns about ISDS.   416 At the same time, it seems logical to include some emphasis on the reassuring 
themes of familiarity and continuity in treaty practice, as well as the United States' perfect record in deflecting 
investment treaty claims. Combining these two stands, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, describes TPP 
as "a reform of the system."   417
Fleshing out the theme of continuity, materials posted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
("USTR") note that ISDS already appears in over 3,000 investment treaties concluded among 180 states, including 
51 treaties concluded by the United States.   418 They also boast that the "United States has never lost an ISDS 
case."   419 Turning to the theme of reform, however, the materials underscore that TPP "upgrades and improves 
ISDS" by including "new ISDS safeguards that close loopholes and raise standards higher than any past 
agreements."   420 In addition, the materials indicate that TPP "serves to modernize and reform ISDS by including 
clearer language and stronger safeguards that raise standards above virtually all other 3,000 plus investment 
agreements in force today."   421 In other words, official pronouncements tend to depict TPP's  [*189]  investment 
chapter as a fulcrum that catapults the U.S. and other states parties to the global summit of investment treaty 
practice.   422
Across the board, however, informed observers have described TPP's investment chapter as the perpetuation of 
long-established U.S. treaty practice with a handful of refinements unlikely to excite those who anticipated genuine 
reform. Thus, a well-known journalist in the professional press writes that TPP's investment chapter "looks familiar -
- particularly in relation to recent U.S. investment treaties and FTAs."   423 Consistent with that assessment, his 
headline declares that TPP's investment chapter includes only "a few novel twists."   424 Likewise, a former USTR 
negotiator writes that TPP's investment chapter "reveals no major departures" from the 2012 U.S. Model BIT.   425 
Consistent with that assessment, her headline indicates that TPP's investment chapter includes "few surprises."   
426
 Similarly, two policy advocates from Columbia University opine that "ISDS in TPP has not been improved as 
USTR suggests."   427 To the contrary, they conclude that the refinements found in TPP's investment chapter 
agreements/colombia-fta/fmal-text (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1.4 (entered into force 
Mar. 15, 2012),available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text (last visited Mar. 25, 
2016); U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Annex 1.3 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2009),available at https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/perutpa/final-text (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.1 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 2004),available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2016); U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Annex 1.A (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004),available at 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
308 
 Di Rosa, supra note 305.
309 
  See Crook, supra note 300, at 662 (observing that the "text does not alter core investment protections set out in the previous 
model adopted in 2004"); Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. 
REG. 151, 189 (2012) ("With minor exceptions, the provisions of the 2004 BIT . . . were left virtually unchanged in the 2012 
Model BIT"); David A. Gantz, Challenges for the United States in Negotiating a BIT with China: Reconciling Reciprocal 
Investment Protection with Policy Concerns, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 217 (2014) (stating that the 2012 U.S. Model 
BIT "in most respects . . . does not differ significantly from the 2004 version"); Di Rosa, supra note 305 ("The new model BIT 
made no changes to the substantive investment law protections"); Johnson, supra note 175, at 1 (opining that "the 2012 Model 
BIT is relatively unchanged from its previous form").
310 
 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 300, Art. 8(1)(h); Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 300, at 799-800; Johnson, supra note 175, 
at 3.
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  See Di Rosa, supra note 305 ("The arbitration clauses were also kept largely untouched").
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greatly from its 2004 predecessor"); Johnson, supra note 175, at 1 (indicating that "[t]hose looking for drastic change. . . are 
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"represent just small tweaks around the margins,"   428 as opposed to the "novel features" that USTR promised to 
deliver in the final text.   429
In the most comprehensive analysis published to date, two researchers from the Graduate Institute in Geneva 
describe TPP's investment chapter as "made in the USA,"   430 as an instrument that "closely follows" existing U.S. 
treaty practice,   431 and as a text that "offers few truly novel features."   432 To back up their claims, they 
emphasize that TPP's investment chapter draws 82% of its text  [*190]  verbatim from the U.S.-Colombia FTA.   433 
Under these circumstances, they repeatedly state that TPP renders the investment chapters of existing U.S. FTAs 
with six other TPP states parties "largely redundant."   434 Furthermore, given the extent of overlap, the authors 
express surprise and consternation at the decision of states parties to maintain those treaties in force following 
ratification of TPP.   435 In other words, one feels an overwhelming sense of continuity, at least for U.S. investors, 
for whom TPP's investment chapter both restates existing norms and makes no attempt to replace treaties already 
in force.
IV. BREAKTHROUGHS
TPP's investment chapter may seem unremarkable when viewed from the abstract perspective of recent U.S. treaty 
practice, in the sense that it repeats familiar patterns and includes few departures from the status quo.  436 
However, when viewed from the concrete perspective of U.S. investors with investment claims against other states 
parties, the picture changes dramatically. In fact, TPP's investment chapter becomes a fascinating puzzle that alters 
the state of play dramatically, depending on the host state and the nature of the claims involved. Developing the 
points just made, Part IV(A) explains how TPP's investment chapter alters the state of play for U.S. investors in the 
five states with which the U.S. previously lacked investment treaties.  437 Likewise, Part IV(B) explains how TPP's 
investment chapter alters the state of play for certain U.S. investors in the six states with which the U.S. already has 
FTAs.  438 Finally, Part IV(C) describes how a familiar treaty provision seems likely to produce unexpected and 
unwelcome consequences in the multilateral context of TPP.  439
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A. Old Policies on New Frontiers
Even if TPP seems like an unremarkable elaboration of longstanding trends in U.S. investment treaty practice, one 
must not forget that the United States currently lacks investment treaties with five TPP states, namely Brunei, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam.   440 For U.S. investors in those jurisdictions, TPP marks the advent 
of treaty protection and investor-state arbitration. As explained below, the extension of old policies to new frontiers 
represents no small thing.
 [*191]  Taking Malaysia as a first example, the United States represents the third largest source of inbound FDI in 
that country.   441 Concentrated in manufacturing, energy, and financial services,   442 the stock of U.S. investment 
in Malaysia totals somewhere between $ 12 billion and $ 30 billion, depending on the source of information and the 
inclusion of investments routed through foreign affiliates of U.S. companies.   443 While not known as a high-risk 
jurisdiction for expropriation,   444 Malaysia traditionally has tied the receipt of investment incentives to performance 
requirements, including export performance, local content requirements, and mandatory technology transfers.   445 
Following TPP's  [*192]  entry into force, Malaysia will have somewhat less freedom to subject U.S. investors to 
such measures.   446
In addition to performance requirements, Malaysia struggles with significant levels of official corruption,   447 and 
foreign investors frequently complain about a "lack of transparency in government decision making."   448 There is 
also a perception that the Malaysian government applies unwritten rules that favor local companies, particularly in 
the field of government procurement.   449 While TPP does not require national treatment in government 
procurement,   450 its investment chapter can afford a measure of protection against die types of concerns just 
described via application of the minimum standard of treatment,   451 which tribunals often recognize as 
incorporating basic principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and vindication of legitimate expectations.   452
http://www.state.govidocuments/organization/214378.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). By 2013, the stock of outward U.S. FDI in 
TPP countries reached $ 983 billion, and the stock of inward FDI from TPP countries reached $ 664 billion. Brock,2015, supra 
note 317, at 4.
319 
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longstanding non-tariff barriers, including import licensing requirements and other restrictions"); see also Larry Cata Backer, The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the US. and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order, 13 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 49, 54 (2014) (explaining that TPP's achievements will "include . . . the provision of comprehensive 
market access by eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade").
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Turning to Vietnam as a second example, the significance of extending old policies to new frontiers seems even 
more obvious. As with Malaysia, quantifications of U.S. investment stock in Vietnam occupy a surprisingly broad 
range. According to official U.S. sources, the stock of U.S. FDI in Vietnam amounts to less than $ 1.5 billion, but is 
growing rapidly.   453 By contrast, official  [*193]  Vietnamese sources place the stock of U.S. investment upwards of 
$ 10 billion,   454 though this may reflect pledged as opposed to disbursed FDI.   455
Although Vietnam has distinguished itself as an "increasingly attractive" destination for FDI,   456 the country's 
political and legal environment still present a number of risks. Unlike Malaysia, for example, Vietnam remains a 
place where foreign investors still face a real possibility of expropriations,   457 as well as harassment by officials 
seeking to renegotiate the terms of investment licenses.   458 In addition, decentralization and a lack of 
transparency in the licensing process contribute to significant levels of official corruption,   459 with overwhelming 
majorities of U.S. investors identifying bribe-taking and kickbacks as a source of concern when operating in 
Vietnam.   460 In addition, Vietnam has a weak court  [*194]  system that operates slowly and seems ineffective at 
resolving disputes.   461 While TPP's investment chapter does not, of course eliminate such risks, the extension of 
traditional investment treaty norms and ISDS to this new frontier significantly increases the security of U.S. 
investors operating in Vietnam. Viewed from that perspective, TPP unquestionably changes the state of play.
Concluding with Japan as a third example, one must recognize that it presents few of the risks likely to affect U.S. 
investors in Malaysia and Vietnam. In the post-war period, Japan has no history of uncompensated takings.   462 
The government does not impose performance requirements.   463 The country has an independent judicial system 
with vast experience in resolving commercial disputes.   464 And the "exchange of cash for favors by government 
officials in Japan is extremely rare."   465 However, even under broadly analogous conditions, U.S. investors have 
justifiably invoked NAFTA's investment chapter to secure remedies for breaches of investment norm s by federal 
and provincial governments in Canada.   466 In this regard, it bears emphasizing that Japan's regulatory system 
leaves room for improvement in terms of transparency, consistency, and responsiveness.   467 Also, while the most 
330 
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331 
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obvious forms of official corruption may be rare, close webs of relations between government and business lead to 
a favoritism that "manifests itself most frequently and seriously in Japan through  [*195]  the rigging of bids on 
government public works projects."   468 Furthermore, while Japan has taken legislative action to combat such 
practices, "questions remain" as to whether it will result in greater accountability for "illegal bid-rigging."   469 As 
previously noted, while TPP's investment chapter does not require national treatment in government procurement, 
the international minimum standard offers some protection against serious encroachments on transparency, non-
discrimination, and the legitimate expectations of foreign investors.   470
Extension of TPP's investment chapter to Japan does not simply alter the state of play for U.S. investors. It also 
alters the state of play for the U.S. and Japanese governments. As is well known, Japan represents the third largest 
economy in the world,   471 the United States' fourth largest trading partner,   472 and the second largest source of 
FDI in the United States,   473 totaling some $ 344 billion.   474 Although Japanese companies have not been active 
in pursuing claims under investment treaties,   475 it may be only a matter of time before the United States 
government finds itself defending Japanese investment claims following ratification of TPP.
The reverse also holds true. Although U.S. companies account for only $ 123 billion of investment stock in Japan,  
476
 that still makes the United States by far and away the single largest source of inbound FDI in Japan.  477 
Furthermore,  [*196]  because U.S. companies easily qualify as the most frequent users of investment treaty 
arbitration,  478 the Japanese public has become apprehensive that ratification of TPP will lead to recurring 
assertion of investment claims by U.S. companies and, possibly, frustration of the Japanese government's ability to 
maintain normal regulatory policies.  479 Concerns about an avalanche of U.S. investment claims may loom 
particularly large in the Japanese consciousness because Japan has never been the target of investment treaty 
claims.  480 In this sense, too, extension of traditional norms to new frontiers represents no small thing in relations 
between states.
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B. New Policies on Old Frontiers
As mentioned, the United States already has FTAs including investment chapters with six states parties to TPP, 
namely Australia, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Singapore.   481 As also discussed, observers generally regard 
TPP as repeating familiar patterns drawn from recent U.S. investment treaty practice.   482 In the most 
comprehensive analysis published to date, two researchers described TPP as "largely redundant" when compared 
to the investment chapters of existing FTAs with other states parties.   483 While the overlap between the 
investment chapters of TPP and U.S. FTAs may be overwhelming in some cases, differences remain. For example, 
while the investment chapters of TPP and the U.S.-Peru TPA reflect a textual coincidence of roughly 80%,   484 that 
means the texts diverge roughly 20% of the time. Likewise, while the investment chapters of TPP and NAFTA enjoy 
a textual coincidence of roughly 60%,   485 that means the texts diverge roughly 40% of the time. Given these 
differences, it seems likely that  [*197]  U.S. investors will find material differences between TPP and existing FTAs 
on discrete topics, with the result that TPP could possibly change the state of play for U.S. investors, depending on 
(1) the relationship between TPP and existing treaties in the event of conflict, (2) the host state involved, and (3) the 
nature of the issues raised by the claim.
Starting with the question of the relationship between TPP and existing FTAs, the general rule is that subsequent 
treaties between the same parties prevail to the extent of inconsistencies with earlier treaties.   486 Starting from 
that premise, one observer has expressed the expectation that TPP's investment chapter would prevail over 
existing U.S. FTAs to the extent of inconsistency.   487 However, under TPP, the states parties expressly affirm their 
existing rights and obligations under international agreements with any other state party.   488 Thus, the better view 
seems to be that TPP's investment chapter has the potential to coexist alongside the investment chapters of FTAs 
already in force between states parties.   489
light of the regulatory purpose of the measure"); SALACUSE, supra note 35, at 250 ("Tribunals will often not find a breach of the 
national treatment standard . . . if there is a justified policy reason for the differential treatments").
353 
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Of course, this does nor preclude states parties from choosing to suspend or terminate existing treaties on the 
same topics through side agreements. For example, Australia has confirmed through side letters that its BITs with 
Mexico, Peru and Vietnam will terminate upon TPP's entry into force, subject, however, to transitional provisions 
that contemplate continued application of the BITs for a period of years with respect to investments made, and 
measures adopted, before termination.   490 By contrast, side letters between Malaysia and New Zealand explicitly 
confirm that TPP's entry into force will not affect the existing FTA between the two states, and that investors may 
choose to pursue claims under the more favorable of the two instruments.   491 As of this writing, the United States 
has not concluded any side letters expressly addressing the status of existing FTAs between the United States and 
other states parties to TPP. Under these circumstances, some observers have opined that NAFTA will remain in 
force among Canada, Mexico and the United States.   492 However, at a recent conference, the author heard 
rumors that USTR may possibly consider the use of side agreements with Canada and Mexico to suspend or 
terminate operation of  [*198]  NAFTA upon TPP's entry into force. Even if the United States successfully concluded 
side agreements on the suspension or termination of NAFTA, transitional provisions presumably would contemplate 
continued application of NAFTA to existing investments and measures for some period of years.   493
As a result, it seems likely that at least some U.S. investors will have the choice to assert investment claims under 
TPP or existing FTAs for at least some period of time,   494 meaning that those U.S. investors will likely have to pay 
counsel for analysis of their rights under each of the relevant instruments. As explained below, such investigations 
would show that TPP can change the state of play for particular U.S. investors.
For U.S. companies with investments in Australia, TPP will almost always seem more favorable because the 
investment chapter of the existing U.S.-Australia FTA does not provide for investor-state arbitration.   495 In other 
words, TPP literally opens the door to arbitration of investment claims,   496 which represents a vast improvement 
over the status quo. However, this observation does not apply to claims challenging tobacco control measures, 
which states parties can elect to remove from dispute settlement under TPP's investment chapter, even following 
submission of a claim to arbitration.   497
360 
  Id. Annex 9-8 n.36.
361 
  Id. Annex 9-B, P 3(b) & n.37.
362 
  Id. Art. 9.9(1)(h).
363 
  Id. Art. 9.9(1)(i).
364 
  Id. Art. 9.18(4).
365 
  See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
366 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.18(1)(a)(i), (1 )(b)(i).
367 
  See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
368 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.1.
369 
  Id. Art. 9.1 & n.8.
370 
  Id. Art. 9.1 n.9.
371 
  Id. Annex 9-L, P A.1(a).
372 
  Id. Annex 9-L, P A.1 (b).
373 
  See Peterson, supra note 355 (observing that an arbitration clause in an investment agreement will not preclude arbitration 
under TPP if the investment agreement contemplates arbitration under the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or 
provides for arbitration within the territory of the host state).
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 [*199]  For U.S. investors with claims against Canada or Mexico, NAFTA's investment chapter generally represents 
a better choice than TPP. To begin with, NAFTA entered into force in 1994,   498 at a time before investment 
treaties excited the public consciousness,   499 before the backlash against investor-state arbitration gathered 
momentum,   500 and before the introduction of treaty refinements designed to tilt investment treaties back towards 
the regulatory interests of states.   501 In other words, NAFTA embodies a text that more consciously aims to 
protect foreign investment, as opposed to the regulatory interests of host states.   502
When weighing the choice between NAFTA and TPP, one also has to consider the operation of MFN clauses, 
which grant claimants "the right to benefit from substantive guarantees contained in third treaties."   503 Like many 
U.S. investment treaties, NAFTA and TPP both contain reservations preventing the application of MFN clauses to 
treaties already signed or ratified before entry into force,   504 meaning that the MFN provisions only pull in the more 
favorable  [*200]  provisions of subsequent investment treaties. In other words, reliance on  [*201]  NAFTA's 
investment chapter allows U.S. investors to invoke any more favorable provisions of TPP or of the dozens of 
investment treaties ratified by Canada or Mexico since 1994.   505 By contrast, the MFN provisions of TPP do not 
reach backwards in time to incorporate the more favorable provisions of NAFTA or other investment treaties already 
concluded by Canada or Mexico. So, the prospective application of MFN treatment generally makes NAFTA's 
investment chapter a better choice than TPP for U.S. investors with claims against Canada or Mexico.
However, depending on the nature of their claims, certain U.S. investors might prefer TPP over NAFTA. For 
example, if TPP includes a more favorable provision that the MFN guarantee of NAFTA cannot reach, U.S. 
investors might prefer to rely on TPP. In this context, it seems relevant to note that TPP includes a broader 
definition of investments,   506 and that prevailing jurisprudence does not permit the use of MFN provisions to 
expand the definition of covered investments.   507 Therefore, if a U.S. national sought to assert an investment 
374 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.18(2). This represents an important point because claims arising under investment treaties (as 
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claim  [*202]  against Canada or Mexico that depended on a particularly broad definition of investments, TPP could 
become the preferred vehicle for the claim.
As a second example of provisions on which TPP seems more favorable to investors than NAFTA, one may identify 
the scope of claims subject to investor-state arbitration under the respective treaties. While NAFTA only permits 
investor-state arbitration of treaty claims,   508 TPP also permits arbitration of certain claims under investment 
authorizations and investment agreements relating to natural resources, public utilities, and infrastructure projects.   
509
 In this respect, the relevant TPP provisions operate in a manner that resembles an umbrella clause.   510 
However, it seems doubtful that NAFTA's guarantee of MFN treatment would reach such provisions for several 
reasons. First, tribunals have divided on the question of whether MFN treatment even applies to modalities for 
dispute settlement under investment treaties.   511 Second, the United States has long taken the view that the 
particular formulation of the MFN obligation in U.S. investment treaties does not reach the modalities for dispute 
settlement because it only applies to treatment of investors and investments in seven specified stages of 
investment activity, none of which includes dispute settlement.   512 Third, the states parties to TPP have expressly 
agreed that TPP's guarantee of MFN treatment does not apply to dispute settlement,   513 and the text of TPP's 
article on MFN treatment is identical to the corresponding provision in NAFTA.   514 Fourth, even assuming that 
MFN obligations provide some leeway for application to dispute settlement, tribunals have shown little enthusiasm 
for the use of MFN clauses to expand the scope of jurisdiction to embrace completely different sorts of claims.   515 
In particular, one tribunal has rejected the use of MFN clauses to secure treaty arbitration of contractual claims not 
entitled to treaty arbitration in the basic  [*203]  agreement.   516 Therefore, if a U.S. investor sought to assert a 
claim against Canada or Mexico for the breach of investment authorizations or investment agreements, TPP's 
investment chapter would represent the only possible vehicle for the claim.
As a third example of provisions on which TPP may be more favorable to investors than NAFTA, TPP includes a 
statute of limitations six months longer than the one established by NAFTA's investment chapter.   517 While a 
substantial body of arbitral jurisprudence supports the use of MFN provisions to incorporate the more favorable 
387 
 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 28(3).
388 
  See UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, Art. 4 (2014), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2016); ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, Art. 37(2) (2006); Statement of the [NAFTA] Free Trade Commission on Non-
Disputing Party Participation, § B (Oct. 7, 2003),available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2016).
389 
  See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209, Art. 26(1); see also U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 307, Art. 10.18(1); U.S-Chile 
FTA, supra note 307, Art. 10.17(1); U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 307, Art. 15.17(1); NAFTA, supra note 55, Arts. 1116(2), 
1117(2).
390 




  See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
393 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.22(7).
394 
  See supra notes 224, 228 and accompanying text.
395 
  See, e.g., Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, Award P 199 (Mar. 31, 2010) (relying on Waste Mgmt v. Mexico, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award P 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.italaw.com/documents/laudo_ingles.pdf, for the 
proposition that fair and equitable treatment prohibits "conduct that is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic which, in so 
far as it also encompasses questions of due process, leads to an outcome which 'offends judicial propriety'"), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/merrill-09.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 
2016); Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award P 133 (June 26, 2003) (relying on Mondev 
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provisions of other treaties regulating timing and sequencing of investment disputes,   518 decisions are not uniform,   
519
 and often draw well-framed dissents.   520 Also, as just mentioned, there are good reasons to doubt that the 
particular formulation of the MFN obligation in NAFTA's investment chapter encompasses the modalities for dispute 
settlement.   521 Therefore, if a U.S. investor could not quite meet the three-year limitations period set forth in 
NAFTA's investment chapter, it might prefer the certainty of relying on the six-month extension in TPP instead of 
proceeding under NAFTA, invoking NAFTA's MFN obligation in order to reach the extension, and hoping for the 
best.
Turning to other U.S. FTAs with states parties to TPP, one may take the agreements with Singapore and Chile as a 
pair. Both entered into force on January 1, 2004,   522 meaning that both emerged against the background of the 
 [*204]  negotiating objectives set by Congress in TPA,   523 as well as efforts by the Executive Branch to bring U.S. 
BIT practice into alignment with U.S. FTA practice.   524 Given these facts, the investment chapters of both FTAs 
more closely resemble TPP's investment chapter. Thus, according to two researchers from the Graduate Institute in 
Geneva, the investment chapter of the U.S.-Chile FTA represents the eighth of 20 international investment 
agreements that most closely resemble TPP's investment chapter (with a textual coincidence of 78%),   525 
whereas the investment chapter of the U.S.-Singapore FTA represents the tenth of 20 international investment 
agreements that most closely resemble TPP's investment chapter (with a textual coincidence of 75%).   526
Despite the high degree of textual overlap, U.S. investors with claims against Chile or Singapore generally should 
prefer to rely on the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs instead of TPP. While the U.S.-Chile FTA and the U.S.-
Singapore FTA may aim to protect the regulatory interests of states far more than did NAFTA, reliance on existing 
FTAs would allow U.S. investors to invoke the MFN articles of those investment chapters, thereby gaining the 
benefit of more favorable provisions in TPP and in BITs or FTAs concluded by Chile and Singapore after 2004.   527 
In addition, by relying on existing FTAs, U.S. investors would avoid the less favorable provisions of TPP, including 
its emphasis on the burden of proof for claims involving the minimum standard of treatment,   528 the limitation of 
damages to historical cost for thwarted investments,   529 the express limitation of damages to losses incurred in 
one's capacity as an investor,   530 and the exclusion of claims that challenge tobacco control measures.   531
International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award 127 (Oct 11, 2002),available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf, as a proper understanding of the international minimum standard of 
treatment),available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
396 




 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award PP 602-07, 616 (June 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
399 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.28(2).
400 
  See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
401 
  See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
402 
 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award PP 93, 123-27, 162, 193-95, 222, 236, 256, 268, 289-98 (Nov. 13, 2000), 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-18.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2016); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award PP 126-27, 129-39 (Oct. 21, 2002),available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-review-02.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2016).
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 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.28(4).
404 
  See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/l, Award PP 120-22 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
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 [*205]  However, as with NAFTA, U.S. investors should prefer TPP to the extent that its investment chapter 
includes more favorable provisions that lie beyond the reach of MFN clauses in existing FTAs.   532 As with NAFTA,   
533
 the investment chapters of the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs include a three-year statute of limitations,   
534
 making TPP slightly more favorable for investors who cannot quite meet that deadline.   535 Unlike NAFTA,   536 
the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs provide for arbitration of disputes under investment authorizations and 
investment agreements.   537 However, the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs narrowly define investment 
agreements only to include a written undertaking that "grants rights to natural resources or other assets that a 
national authority controls."   538 By contrast, TPP defines investment agreements to include written agreements 
with a national authority "with respect to natural resources that a national authority controls," or to supply utility 
services to the public on behalf of a party (such as power, water, or telecommunications), or to undertake public 
infrastructure projects (such as the construction of roads, bridges canals, dams, or pipelines).   539 Therefore, 
because the MFN clauses in the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs would probably not reach the broader 
definition of state contracts subject to treaty arbitration,   540 for U.S. investors with claims against Chile or 
Singapore based on agreements relating to utility services or infrastructure projects, TPP might become the 
preferred vehicle for the assertion of such claims.
In addition, while the same issue does not arise under the U.S.-Singapore FTA, it seems relevant to say that the 
U.S.-Chile FTA completely excludes public debt from the substantive disciplines of the FTA's investment chapter,   
541
 except claims sounding in national treatment or MFN treatment,   542 meaning that the U.S.-Chile FTA also 
excludes public debt claims from dispute settlement, except for claims sounding in national treatment or MFN 
treatment. By contrast, TPP does not exclude public debt from substantive disciplines of TPP's investment chapter.   
543
 However, to the extent that host states other than Singapore and the  [*206]  United States have entered into a 
negotiated restructuring with investors holding 75% of the aggregate principal amount under a debt instrument,   544 
TPP's investment chapter prevents the submission of claims to arbitration (or the continuation of arbitration),   545 
except for claims sounding in national treatment or MFN treatment.   546 Thus, to the extent that a U.S. investor has 
405 
 Luke Eric Peterson, Newly Obtained Award Confirms that Libya Must Pay $ 935 Million to Kuwaiti Investor for Hotel-Resort 
Complex that Never Got Built, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., July 24, 2013, available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/newly-
obtained-award-confirms-that-libya-must-pay-935-million-to-kuwaiti-investor-for-hotel-resort-complex-that-never-got-built (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2016).
406 
 Peterson, supra note 355 (indicating that TPP Art. 9.28(4) does not allow claimants to seek compensation for "projected 
losses arising out of the thwarted opportunity").
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  Id. Annex 9-G.
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  Id. P 1.
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  Id. Art. 9.1 & Annex 9-G, P 2.
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  Id. Annex 9-G, P 2.
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  See Chris Kirkham, "This Isn't NAFTA," U.S. Trade Representative Says About Trans-Pacific Partnership, L.A. TTMES, Dec. 
10, 2015 ("Whatever your position is on NAFTA, this isn't NAFTA"), available at http://www.latirnes.com/business/la-fi-qa-tpp-
20151210-story.html; John Harwood,The Politics of Trade: Top U.S. Negotiator Answers 10 Questions, N.Y. TTMES, Feb. 6, 
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a treaty claim against Chile based on non-payment of public debt, to the extent that the claim does not sound in 
national treatment or MFN treatment, and to the extent that Chile does not enter into a negotiated restructuring, 
TPP would represent the better vehicle for the assertion of that claim.
Turning to the last remaining U.S. FTA with a state party to TPP, one should observe that the U.S.-Peru TPA 
entered into force as of January 1, 2009.   547 Not surprisingly, the investment chapter of the U.S.-Peru TPA closely 
resembles TPP's investment chapter. In fact, two researchers from the Graduate Institute in Geneva list the 
investment chapter of the U.S.-Peru TPA as the second of twenty international investment agreements that most 
closely resemble TF'P's investment chapter (with a textual coincidence of 81%).   548
Despite the overwhelming degree of textual overlap, U.S. investors with claims against Peru generally should prefer 
to rely on the U.S.-Peru TPA instead of TPP. While the U.S.-Peru TPA resembles TPP in almost all material 
aspects, reliance on the U.S.-Peru TPA would allow U.S. investors to invoke the MFN article of its investment 
chapter, thereby gaining the benefit of more favorable provisions in TPP and in FTAs concluded by Peru after 2009.   
549
 In addition, by relying on the U.S.-Peru TPA, U.S. investors would avoid the less favorable provisions of TPP 
already mentioned in connection with the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs.   550
However, as with NAFTA, the U.S-Chile FTA, and the U.S. Singapore-FTA, U.S. investors should prefer TPP to the 
extent that its investment chapter includes more favorable provisions that lie beyond the reach of the MFN clause in 
the  [*207]  U.S.-Peru TPA.   551 As with the agreements just mentioned,   552 the investment chapter of the U.S.-
Peru TPA includes a three-year statute of limitations,   553 making TPP slightly more favorable for investors who 
cannot quite meet that deadline.   554 Unlike the agreements just mentioned,   555 the U.S.-Peru TPA provides for 
arbitration of disputes under investment authorizations and investment agreements, and for arbitration of public 
debt claims, on exactly the same terms as TPP, thereby eliminating any advantage of proceeding under the U.S.-
Peru TPA for such claims.   556
and environmental standards, putting them at the core of the agreement. That's exactly what we're doing through T.P.P. -- but 
not just with Mexico and Canada, with 40 percent of the global economy."), available at 
http://www.nytirnes.com/2015/02/07/business/10-questions-for-president-obamas-trade-negotiator.html?_r=0; U.S. Trade 
Rep.,The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Upgrading the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) [hereinafter TPP: 
Upgrading the NAFTA] (recognizing that "past trade deals -- including the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA -- 
haven't always lived up to the hype," but asserting that "TPP . . . improves substantially on NAFTA's shortcomings"), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-the-North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement-NAFTA-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2016).
415 
  See Cynthia English, Opinion Briefing: North American Free Trade Agreement, Gallup, Dec. 12, 2008 (indicating that 53% of 
Americans surveyed felt that "that the effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been 'mainly negative'"), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/113200/opinion-briefing-north-american-free-trade-agreement.aspx?version=print; Angus Reid Public 
Opinion, Americans and Canadians Feel They Have Lost Out with NAFTA, May 17, 2012, at 5 (indicating that 53% of American 
respondents felt that the United States should either renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from NAFTA),available at 
http://angusreidglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/2012.05.17_NAFTA.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
416 
  See Ambassador Miriam Sapiro, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Negotiations: Reaching a Consensus on Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, GLOBAL VIEWS, Oct. 2015, at 1 ("Government officials, legislators, and progressive and conservative 
groups on both sides of the Atlantic have raised concerns about ISDS"), available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/10/transatlantic-trade-investment-negotiations-
sapiro/GlobalViews5Oct2015_FINAL.pdf?la=en;see also Richard Allen, TTIPping the Balance: The Crusade Against Investor-
State Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS, June 3, 2015 (mentioning "the sudden uproar against ISDS, not only by civil society but 
also by prominent politicians and policy-makers in both the US and EU"), available at http://globalarbitrationnews.com/ttipping-
the-balance-the-crusade-against-investor-state-arbitration-20150602. 
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However, TPP seems more favorable on one topic that lies beyond the reach of the MFN clause of the U.S.-Peru 
TPA. When it comes to the pursuit of local remedies, the U.S.-Peru TPA contains two fork-in-the-road provisions. 
According to the first, investors who initially pursue claims for violations of investment authorizations and investment 
agreements before the courts or the administrative tribunals of the respondent state cannot subsequently alter 
course and pursue investor-state arbitration under the FTA. According to the second, U.S. investors who who 
initially pursue treaty claims before Peruvian courts or administrative tribunals cannot subsequently alter course and 
pursue investor-state arbitration under the FTA. By contrast, TPP's investment chapter omits the first fork-in-the-
road provision, but includes the second with respect to Chile, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam. Therefore, because the 
MFN clauses in the U.S.-Peru TPA probably would not reach the more favorable fork-in-the-road provisions of TPP,   
557
 TPP's investment chapter might become the preferred vehicle for the assertion of claims under investment 
authorizations and investment agreements that U.S. investors had initially pursued in proceedings before Peruvian 
courts or administrative tribunals.
Based on the foregoing discussion, one thing should be clear: while the introduction of TPP's investment chapter 
may support a general sense of continuity with recent trends in U.S. investment treaty practice,  558 TPP's 
investment chapter appears more remarkable and complex when viewed from the perspectives of individual U.S. 
investors trying to understand how TPP alters the state of play for them. For U.S. investors in states parties that do 
not yet have FTAs with the United States, TPP's investment chapter signals the advent of  [*208]  treaty protection 
and ISDS.  559 This represents no small thing, regardless of whether the host state has a corrupt government 
emerging from decades of communist rule (such as Vietnam), or a more ethical government grounded in several 
decades of democratic administration and market orientation (such as Japan). For U.S. investors in states parties 
that already have FTAs with the United States, the decision to keep those agreements in force alongside TPP 
creates a fascinating puzzle in which TPP dramatically alters the state of play for U.S. investors, depending on the 
host state and the nature of the claims.  560
417 
 Shawn Donnan, US Looks to TPP to Reform Arbitration System, FIN. TIMES, NOV. 8, 2015, available at 
https://next.ft.com/content/d7379996-862b-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896 (last visited Mar. 27, 2016);see also TPP: Upgrading the 
NAFTA, supra note 414 (describing TPP as "a renegotiation of NAFTA," in the sense that TPP will hold Mexico to "fully 
enforceable" provisions on labor).
418 






  Id. (emphasis added).
422 
  Compare supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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 Melida Hodgson, The Leaked TPP Investment Chapter Draft: Few Surprises . . . Is that a Surprise?, TRANSNAT'L DISP. 
MGMT., NOV. 2015, at 1, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2283 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2016). The author is a former Associate General Counsel at USTR, participated in the development of the 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT, and was involved in negotiations of the investment chapters of four U.S. FTAs.Id. at 1, n. 1.
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  Id. at 1.
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 Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP's Investment Chapter: Entrenching, Rather than Reforming, A Flawed System, Colum. 
Ctr. on Sustainable Devel. Pol'y Paper, Nov. 2015, at 1, available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/ll/TPP-entrenching-flaws-
21-Nov-FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
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  Id. at 19.
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C. Old Rules in New Contexts
Based on the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that some U.S. investors will have to, or will prefer to, bring 
certain investment claims under TPP because (1) the relevant state does not have another investment treaty with 
the United States;   561 (2) the existing FTA does not provide for investor-state arbitration;   562 or (3) the particular 
claim raises issues dealt with more favorably under TPP, and that part of TPP lies beyond the reach of MFN 
obligations in existing FTAs.   563 While the decision to proceed under TPP will bring into play a number of familiar 
rules drawn from U.S. investment treaty practice,   564 investors may find that some of those rules operate in 
unexpected and unwelcome ways when applied in the context of TPP.
For example, NAFTA's investment chapter provides non-disputing states parties the right to make submissions to 
tribunals on questions involving treaty interpretation.   565 The 2004 Model BIT brought the same principle into U.S. 
BIT practice, and further clarified that non-disputing states parties have the right to make both written and oral 
submissions to tribunals on questions of treaty interpretation.   566 Similar provisions appear in the investment 
chapters of existing U.S. FTAs with Chile,   567 Singapore   568 and Peru.   569 With one exception,   570   [*209]  
administration of submissions by non-disputing parties has worked tolerably well and generated little controversy 
under bilateral or trilateral agreements where there can be no more than one or two non-disputing party 
submissions on any topic.   571
In the context of TPP, however, eleven non-disputing parties will have the right to make written and oral 
submissions on every question of treaty interpretation in every case.   572 If one pauses to consider the logistics 
required to accommodate written and oral submissions by eleven non-disputing states parties, to provide the 
disputing parties opportunities to comment on those submissions, and to incorporate the submissions and 
comments into the decision-making process, it seems evident that application of this rule will substantially increase 
the cost and duration of arbitration proceedings under TPP's investment chapter. In cases where states parties 
express largely concordant views,   573 the piling-on effect may also have substantial effects on the decisions of 
429 
  Id. at 1.
430 
 Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically Situating the TPP in the Investment 
Treaty Universe, Nov. 23, 2015, at 10, available at 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/working_papers/CTEI%202015-
8%20Alschner_Skougarevskiy_TPP.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
431 
  Id. at 8.
432 
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  Id. at 3, 10.
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  Id. at 2, 4, 8, 20, 30.
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  Id. at 23.
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  See supra notes 423-35 and accompanying text.
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  See infra notes 440-80 and accompanying text.
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  See infra notes 481-560 and accompanying text.
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  See infra notes 561-74 and accompanying text.
440 
  See Ian F. Fergusson et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Mar. 20, 2015, at Summary and at 9, fig. 2 (indicating that the United States currently lacks FTAs with Brunei, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016).
27 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 145, *208
Page 46 of 58
 
tribunals.   574 In other words, non-disputing party submissions in the multilateral context of TPP can have far-
reaching consequences. All things being equal, this may deter claimants from proceeding under TPP, as opposed 
to existing FTAs. At the margins, it may discourage investors from asserting claims that raise controversial or 
unsettled issues of treaty interpretation. In any case, what began as a sensible and workable right of intervention 
under bilateral and trilateral agreements seems likely to become a burdensome scheme likely to discourage (or at 
least penalize) the assertion of investment claims under TPP.
V. GEO-STRATEGY AND NORM DIFFUSION
It may seem puzzling, perhaps even "redundant," for the United States to conclude an FTA with eleven states when 
it already has FTAs with more than half those states, particularly when (1) attention falls on a set of obligations that 
exhibit a high degree of congruence across texts; and (2) the states parties agree to maintain their existing 
international agreements in force.   575 However, this perspective overlooks a larger context, in which the United 
States overtly describes TPP as a tool for enhancing its geo-strategic position in the Pacific region.
When the United States concluded NAFTA, public discourse emphasized economic considerations,   576 such as 
better integration of markets and the  [*210]  anticipated gains from unrestricted trade among 360 million people.   
577
 To the extent that NAFTA engaged broader themes, its ratification signaled that economic challenges would not 
force the United States into isolationism,   578 but would prompt the nation to enhance its prosperity through access 
to new customers in new markets.   579 Beyond that, NAFTA did not engage broader strategic themes because the 
United States already enjoyed a secure position as the hegemonic power in North America.   580
 [*211]  The Pacific region presents an entirely different situation. The United States does not enjoy a secure 
position as the hegemonic power along the Pacific Rim. To the contrary, it is engaged in a contest with China for 
political and economic influence.   581 Sometimes, the President of the United States even has to remind listeners 
that the United States is a Pacific state.   582 Under these circumstances, senior officials often describe TPP as a 
441 
  See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Econ. and Bus. Affairs, 2015 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, at 23, Table 3 
(listing Singapore, Japan, and the United States as the top three sources of FDI in Malaysia), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241858.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
442 
  See Export.gov, Doing Business in Malaysia [hereinafter Doing Business in Malaysia], available at 
http://www.export.gov/malaysia/doingbusinessinmalaysia/index.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) ("The U.S. has consistently been 
one of the largest foreign investors in Malaysia, with significant presence in the oil and gas sector, manufacturing, and financial 
services");2015 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, supra note 441, at 3 ("The largest U.S. investments are in the oil and 
gas sector, manufacturing, and financial services"); U.S. Trade Rep., Malaysia, available at https://ustr.gov/countries-
regions/southeast-asia-pacific/malaysia (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) (reporting that "U.S. FDI in Malaysia is led by the 
manufacturing and mining sectors").
443 
 See Doing Business in Malaysia, supra note 442 ("The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector was nearly $ 15 billion in 2012, up from $ 13.9 billion in 2011. . . . Factoring in investments among foreign 
affiliated subsidiaries in the financial and oil and gas sectors would make U.S. FDI in Malaysia significantly higher (perhaps more 
than $ 30 billion)"); 2015 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, supra note 441, at 22, Table 2 (listing official Malaysian 
statistics, which place inbound U.S. FDI at $ 11.6 billion, as well as official U.S. statistics, which place inbound U.S. FDI at $ 16.4 
billion); U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Econ. and Bus. Affairs, 2013 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204686.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) ("U.S. FDI in Malaysia is led by the 
manufacturing, oil and gas, financial services, and consumer products sectors. The total stock of U.S. manufacturing FDI in 
Malaysia was approximately $ 20 billion in 2011 as compared to $ 15 billion in 2010 according to MID A. Including FDI in the 
financial and oil and gas sectors, would make total U.S. FDI significantly higher (perhaps more than $ 30 billion)"); U.S. Trade 
Rep.,Malaysia, supra note 442 (reporting that "U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Malaysia was $ 15.0 billion in 2012 (latest 
data available), a 21.1% increase from 2011").
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tool designed to enhance the geo-strategic position of the United States by establishing a self-identified community 
of Pacific states bound together by a shared commitment to norms based on traditional U.S. values.
As evidence of the United States' conscious deployment of TPP to promote norm diffusion,   583 one may cite White 
House communications, which invite people to look beyond economic considerations: "Trade policy doesn't just 
support our country's economy, it can reflect our country's values too."   584 Building on that theme, the White 
House emphasizes that TPP will allow us to "rewrite the rules of trade to benefit America's middle class. Because if 
we don't, competitors who don't share our values, like China, will step in to fill that void."   585 Thus, the White 
House informs us, "the President's trade policy is the best tool we have to ensure  [*212]  that our workers, our 
businesses, and our values are shaping globalization and the 21st century economy, rather than getting left 
behind."   586
Likewise, United States Trade Representative Michael Froman invites people to consider the strategic (as opposed 
to the purely economic) benefits of TPP. 587 In so doing, he reminds listeners that the Pacific region will be home to 
3.2 billion middle-class consumers by 2030, 588 that it is "a region . . . very much in flux," 589 and that other states 
are seeking to organize the region along much more mercantilist lines. 590 Under these circumstances, he warns 
that the U.S. must "play a leading role in helping to define the rules of the road for the region and not leave that to 
others." 591 To that end, he describes TPP as "the most concrete manifestation" of the administration's strategy to 
lead the process of norm diffusion in Asia and, ultimately, the world:
Well, you know, I think the agreement is, as I mentioned the most concrete manifestation of our rebalancing 
strategy towards Asia. But even more than that, it is a manifestation of U.S. leadership in the world. . . .
The rest of the world is not standing still. Our competitors are not standing still. As we speak, other negotiations 
are going on for other approaches to the global trading system, more mercantilist approaches, more 
444 
  See 2015 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, supra note 441, at 10 ("The Embassy is not aware of any cases of 
uncompensated expropriation of U.S.-held assets by the Malaysian government").
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  See id. at 12 ("Fiscal incentives granted to both foreign and domestic investors historically have been subject to 
performance requirements, usually in the form of export targets, local content requirements and technology transfer 
requirements").
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  See TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.9(2) (a)-(b) (prohibiting states from tying the receipt of advantages to certain local content 
requirements).
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  See 2013 Investment Climate Statement--Malaysia, supra note 443 (emphasizing that "Malaysia ranked in 54th place in 
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index in 2012, and questioning whether domestic processes have the "ability 
to effectively address high-level corruption").
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  Id. Art. 9.6(1).
452 
  See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 145-52 (describing transparency and the vindication of legitimate 
expectations as elements of fair and equitable treatment); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 251-52, 279-94 
(describing nondiscrimination in the application of national law, legitimate expectations, and transparency as elements of fair and 
equitable treatment); CAMPBELL McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 235-36, 239-42 (describing legitimate expectations, 
transparency, and the absence of arbitrary discrimination as elements of fair and equitable treatment); SALACUSE, supra note 
35, at 231-41 (describing legitimate expectations, transparency and the absence of arbitrary discrimination as elements of fair 
and equitable treatment); VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 234-43, 392-94, 402-04 (describing legitimate expectations, 
transparency, and the absence of unreasonable discrimination as elements of fair and equitable treatment). But see supra note 
398 and accompanying text (indicating that TPP may seek to endorse the analytical approach of Glamis Gold v. United States, 
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protectionist approaches, approaches that allow for the forced transfer of technology or forced transfer of 
intellectual property, agreements that don't have labor and environmental provisions or that don't put disciplines 
on state-owned enterprises or that don't maintain a free and open Internet.
And, you know that--living in that world is much more to the advantage of American workers, farmers, ranches, 
firms of all sizes, if we're living in a world where TPP defines the rules of the road than if we're sitting on the 
sidelines and those rules of the road are set by somebody else.   592
 [*213]  Viewed from this perspective, the layering of TPP on top of several existing FTAs makes sense, even if the 
existing texts substantially overlap and remain in force. The point is not to extend norms piecemeal to new partners 
through bilateral arrangements, but to draw allies and newcomers into a self-identified community that reflects U.S. 
values and functions as a center of gravity in a strategic region where our influence remains contested.   593
In this sense, the strategic use of trade and investment agreements represents a significant shift in recent U.S. 
policy,   594 though it arguably represents less of a departure than a return to grand schemes like the Marshall Plan,   
595
 or the promotion of BITs as an antidote to the NIEO.   596
 [*214]  The ambitiousness and potentially transformative character of TPP becomes apparent when one considers 
that it does not simply reiterate familiar rules on trade and investment. It ties those rules to a broader package that 
includes detailed and enforceable chapters on labor standards, environmental standards, Internet access, and 
transparency.   597 Thus, the White House emphasizes that TPP will require states to prohibit child labor,   598 set 
minimum wages,   599 allow labor unions,   600 combat illegal logging and wildlife trade,   601 permit open access to 
the Internet,   602 and to operate on the basis of regulatory transparency,   603 including requirements for notice,   
604
 comment,   605 and reasoned explanation in the adoption of new standards.   606
in which the tribunal required evidence of state practice to support claims for violation of the international minimum standards, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of success based on emerging principles of transparency and legitimate expectations).
453 
 U.S. Dept. of State, Vietnam: Investment Climate Statement--2015, at 23 (Table 2), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242005.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (indicating that U.S. investment stock in 
Vietnam reached $ 1,398 billion in 2013); U.S. Trade Rep.,Vietnam, available at https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-
asia-pacific/vietnam (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (opining that "U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam (stock) was $ 1.1 
billion in 2012 (latest data available), up 10.4 percent from 2011").
454 
  Vietnam: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 453, at 23 (Table 2) (citing the General Statistic Office of Vietnam 
for the proposition that U.S. investment in Vietnam reached $ 10,619 billion in 2014); Vietnamese Ministry of Planning & 
Investment, Foreign Investment Agency, U.S. Investment in Vietnam, available at http://fia.mpi.gov.vn/detail/3532/US-
Investment-in-Vietnam (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (stating that as "of June of 2015, U.S. investors ranked 7 among 103 foreign 
countries and territories in Vietnam with 742 existing projects worth [$ ]11.6 billion");US Investment in Vietnam Tops $ 11 Billion 
with 735 Projects Countrywide, Tuoi TRE NEWS, Apr. 16, 2015, available at http://tuoitrenews.vn/business/27504/us-
investment-in-vietnam-tops-ll-billion-with-735-projects-countrywide (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (reporting that "U.S. investors are 
now present in almost all industries in Vietnam and have so far pumped more than US$ 11 billion" into Vietnam, with some $ 
4.68 billion in the hospitality sector alone).
455 
  Vietnam: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 453, at 23 (Table 2).
456 
  Id. at 3.
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The emergence of such a community in Asia under U.S. leadership would represent no small thing. It is a shame 
that the leading presidential candidates for both parties seem unable to support TPP's strategic vision for U.S. 
457 
  See id. at 8-9 (reporting that the "U.S. Mission is monitoring four foreign investment expropriation cases without just 
compensation").
458 
  See id. at 9 (indicating that "[s]everal foreign investors have reported that provincial or the national government pressured 
them to increase the pace of project development or to raise additional project capital or risk losing their investment license").
459 
  See id. at 6 (explaining that "[m]any U.S. firms have invested successfully, though a lack of transparency in the procedure 
for obtaining a business license at times makes participation in investment opportunities too risky for companies that comply with 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act"); see also id. at 19 ("Corruption is due in large part to a low level of transparency, 
accountability, and media freedom, as well as low pay for government officials and inadequate systems for holding officials 
accountable for their actions. Competition among agencies for control over business and investments has created overlapping 
jurisdictions and bureaucratic procedures that in turn create opportunities for corruption.").
460 
 Shibani Mahtani, Vietnam Still Hot for American Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2012, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2012/08/31/vietnam-still-hot-for-american-investors (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
461 
  Vietnam: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 453, at 9 (warning that "Vietnam's legal system remains 
underdeveloped and ineffective in settling disputes"); see also id. at 10 (observing that the "court system in Vietnam works 
slowly").
462 
  See U.S. Dept. of State, Japan: Investment Climate Statement--2015, at 9, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241821.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) ("In the post-war period, the Japanese 
Government has not expropriated any enterprises and the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments in Japan is 
extremely unlikely").
463 
  See id. at 12 (observing that "Japan does not maintain performance requirements").
464 
  See id. at 10 (indicating that "Japan has a fully independent judiciary and a consistently applied body of commercial law").
465 
  Id. at 18.
466 
 U.S. investors have secured awards on the merits, or consent awards, against the Canadian government in five cases, two 
of them recently. See Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015), 
available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287; Mobil Inv. Can., Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 
Award (Feb. 20, 2015),available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&dodd=DC6732_En&caseId=C262; 
AbitibiBowater, Inc. v. Canada, Consent Award (Dec. 15, 2010),available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/abitibi-03.pdf; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award (Oct. 21, 
2002),available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-review-
02.pdf; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages (May 31, 2002),available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/pope-phase-36.pdf. 
467 
  Japan: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 462, at 15.
468 




  See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
471 
  Japan: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 462, at 3.
472 
  Id. at 9; U.S. Dept. of Com., Off. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Addresses the American Chamber of 
Commerce of Japan, Oct. 21, 2014 [hereinafter Pritzker Address], at 4, available at https://www.commerce.gov/news/secretary-
speeches/2014/10/us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-addresses-american-chamber. 
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leadership in the region, and the world.
473 
  Prizker Address, supra note 472, at 4; Vinai Thummalapally, Exec. Dir., Select USA, U.S. Dept. of Com., Trends Driving FDI 





  See Yoshimi Ohara, Japan, in THE ASIA-PACIFIC ARB. REV. at 3 n.2 (2016), available at 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/71/sections/238/chapters/2883/japan (explaining that "there is only one published 
treaty arbitration case in which an affiliate of a Japanese investor brought an investment treaty case against a [host] state") 
(citing Saluka Inv. BV v. Czech Rep, Partial Award (Mar 17, 2006),available at http://www.italaw.com/documents/Saluka-
PartialawardFinal.pdf). In addition to cultural factors, it is possible that the relatively small number of Japanese investment 
treaties plays some role in the low incidence of investment treaty claims by Japanese companies.See Ohara, supra, at 1-2 
(stating that China and South Korea both have more than 100 bilateral investment treaties, that "Japan has been far behind with 
only 21 BITs and 14 FTAs," and that eleven of those instruments were executed or entered into force after 2014).
476 
  Japan: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 462, at 21; Pritzker Address, supra note 472, at 4.
477 
 Santander Trade Portal, Japan: Foreign Investment (reporting that, as of 2014, the United States counted for 30.7% of FDI 
inflows into Japan, and that the Netherlands represented the second largest source of FDI inflows into Japan, but that Dutch 
investment amounted to only 16.2% of FDI inflows into Japan), available at https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/japan/foreign-investment (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
478 
 Ohara, supra note 475, at 7 (indicating that U.S. companies "filed investment treaty claims in approximately 2130 cases . . . 
and are by far the most frequent users of the ISDS system").
479 
  See id. at 3, 7 (indicating that TPP negotiations have brought ISDS under attack for the first time in Japan, and attributing 
this to fears that U.S. investors will make promiscuous use of investment claims, thereby impeding the normal operation of the 
Japanese government).
480 
  See Japan: Investment Climate Statement--2015, supra note 462, at 10 (indicating that "[t]here have been no cases of 
international . . . arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and the Government of Japan since 1952"); Ohara, 
supra note 475, at 3 n.2 (observing that "Japan has never been a respondent state" in published investment treaty awards).
481 
 Fergusson et al., supra note 440, at 8.
482 
  See supra notes 423-35 and accompanying text.
483 
  See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
484 
  See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 11 (figure 1); Mapping BITs, TPP Chapter 9 Special [hereinafter 
Mapping], available at http://mappinginvestmenttreaties.com/specials/tpp. 
485 
 See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 10, 11 (figure 1); Mapping, supra note 484.
486 
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 30(3), 1155 U.N.T.S 331.
487 
  NAFTA ISDS and TPP ISDS, INT'L. ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG, comment by Julia Qin, Nov. 6, 2015, available at 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2015/ll/naflaisds-and-tpp-
isds.html?cid=6a00d8341c90a753efrjlbb088c76c9970d#comment-6a00d8341c90a753ef01bb088c76c9970d (last visited Mar. 
16, 2016) (opining that "unless NAFTA parties reach an agreement on how to reconcile its inconsistent provisions with TPP, TPP 
provisions would prevail if a dispute should arise over such inconsistencies").
488 
 TPP, supra note 320, Art. 1.2(1)(b).
489 
 Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 21-22; see also Peterson, supra note 355 (observing tfiat TPP "does not 
purport to supplant, for Canada, Mexico and the United States, the existing North American Free Trade Agreement").
490 
 Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 21-22.
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  Compare supra note 490 and accompanying text.
494 
  See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 23 (explaining that "investors can choose under which treaty to bring an 
investment claim"); see also Peterson, supra note 355, at 1 (concluding that the overlapping treaty obligations "leav[es] open the 
prospect of investor-claimants shopping between the two treaties for the most advantageous rights and dispute settlement 
mechanism").
495 
  See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 18 (recognizing that Australia's existing FTAs with Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand and the United States represent the only existing FTAs between TPP states parties that do not provide for investor-
state arbitration); see also William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on 
the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 22 (2006) ("What distinguishes AUSFTA 
from NAFTA is its lack of a provision for direct investor claims. Enforcement of AUSFTA Chapter 11 is limited to the state-to-
state dispute settlement procedures set forth in Chapter 21.").
496 
  See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 430, at 18 (observing that Australia's FTAs with Japan, Malaysia and the United 
States "have now lost much of their practical significance, because investors can finally bring direct investment claims under the 
parallel TPP").
497 
  See supra notes 407-09 and accompanying text. Using a subsidiary located in a jurisdiction that has an investment treaty 
with Australia providing for investor-state arbitration, cigarette maker Philip Morris brought a high-profile claim challenging 
Australia's plain-packaging laws for cigarettes. Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Australian Defense Strategy Puts Spotlight on 
Timing of Philip Morris's Corporate Structuring Moves, Claims "Abuse" of Investment Treaty, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Dec. 
31, 2011, available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-australian-defense-strategy-puts-spotlight-on-timing-of-philip-
morriss-corporate-structuring-moves-claims-abuse-of-investment-treaty (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). The tribunal hearing that 
matter recently dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson,Australia Prevails in 
Arbitration with Philip Morris over Tobacco Plain Packaging Dispute, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Dec. 15, 2015, available at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevails-in-arbitration-with-philip-morris-over-tobacco-plain-packaging-
dispute (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
498 
 Marc J. Goldstein & Andrea K. Bjorklund, International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 36 INT'L LAW. 401, 416 (2002).
499 
  See Brower, Corporations, supra note 184, at 205-06 & n.184 (indicating that claims brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 
fueled NGO opposition to other international investment agreements, such as the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
and the draft Free Trade Area for the Americas, for which negotiations ultimately failed).
500 
  See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. 
J. INT'L L. 875, 895-96 (2011) (describing how NAFTA investment claims and NGO policy work quickly fueled a backlash in 
state practice against investor-state arbitration).
501 
  See supra notes 223-38, 272-76, 286-89, 291-99 and accompanying text; see also Brower, Corporations, supra note 184, at 
192 (indicating that investment treaty practice following 2004 "emphatically signals a trend towards the rebalancing of investment 
treaties to protect the regulatory space of host states"); Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT, Apr. 2006, 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com (describing the same refinements as the "regressive development of 
international law").
502 
  See Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AMERICAN L. REV. 303, 304 (1997) (describing NAFTA's investment chapter as "a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on steroids - 
a dream come true for the U.S. foreign investor").
503 
 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 211; see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 197 (explaining that 
"the MFN clause multilateralizes investment protections" by creating a network of treaty obligations in which everyone benefits 
from higher standards granted in other treaties).
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504 
  See NAFTA, supra note 55, Annex IV: Exceptions from Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, Schedule of Canada ("Canada 
takes an exception to Article 1103 for treatment accorded under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or 
signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of Mexico ("Mexico takes an exception to Article 1103 
for treatment accorded under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or signed prior to the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement"); Schedule of the United States ("The United States takes an exception to Article 1103 for treatment 
accorded under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement"), available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-
Agreement?mvid=1&secid=bb771460-967f-4458-8243-d3137e3290ec (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).See also TPP, supra note 
320, Annex II: Non-Conforming Measures, Schedule of Australia ("Australia reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure 
that accords more favorable treatment to any service supplier or investor under any bilateral or multilateral international 
agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of Brunei ("Brunei Darussalam 
reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential treatment: (a) to countries under any bilateral or 
multilateral international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement . . . ."); Schedule of 
Canada ("Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain a measure that accords differential treatment to countries under any 
bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); 
Schedule of Chile ("Chile reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential treatment to countries 
under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force on, or signed prior to, the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement"); Schedule of Japan ("Japan reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential treatment 
to countries under any bilateral or multilateral agreement in force on, or signed prior to, the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement"); Schedule of Malaysia ("Malaysia reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential 
treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement"); Schedule of Mexico ("Mexico reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure granting different 
treatment to countries accorded under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force prior to the date of the entry 
into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of New Zealand ("New Zealand reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure 
that accords differential treatment to a Party or a non-Party under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or 
signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of Peru ("Peru reserves the right to adopt or maintain 
any measure that accords differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or 
signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of Singapore ("Singapore reserves the right to adopt or 
maintain any measure that accords differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement 
in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of United States ("The United States 
reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or 
multilateral international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement"); Schedule of 
Vietnam ("Viet Nam reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential treatment: (a) to countries 
under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement 
. . . ."), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2016).
505 
 Since 1994, ten FTAs and 27 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements have entered into force for Canada. 
See Global Affairs Canada, Canada's Free Trade Agreements, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fta-ale.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Mar. 17, 2016);see also Global Affairs Canada, Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection (FIPAs), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
Since 1994, eleven FTAs and 29 BITs have entered into force for Mexico. See United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, International Investment Agreements Navigator, Mexico: Other Investment Agreements, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/136#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Mar. 17, 2016);see also United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment Agreements Navigator, Mexico: Bilateral Investment 
Agreements, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/II A/CountryBits/136#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
506 
  See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (describing the unusually narrow definition of "investment" under NAFTA's 
Chapter 11); see also VANDELVELDE, supra note 18, at 125-26 (indicating that NAFTA's investment chapter adopts an 
enterprise-based definition of "investment" based on an exhaustive list of qualifying assets, and opining that only a "few" 
investment treaties "limit the definition of investment to assets identified in the list").
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507 
  See Vanessa Ventures, Ltd. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, Award P 133 (Jan. 16, 2013) ("The benefit of the 
MFN provision in Article III of the Canada-Venezuela BIT can only be asserted in respect of investments that are within the 
scope of Article 1(f) of the Canada-Venezuela BIT to begin with. The MFN clause cannot be used to expand the category of 
investments to which the Canada-Venezuela BIT applies."); Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award P 144 
(Oct. 4, 2013) ("The question that must be resolved here is whether this MFN obligation extends to the definition of investment in 
Article 1(1) of the BIT. . . . For the reasons given below, the Tribunal finds that this is not the case."); Societe Generale v. 
Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction P 40 (Sept. 19, 2008) ("Each 
treaty defines what it considers a protected investment and who is entitled to that protection, and definitions can change from 
treaty to treaty. In this situation, resort to the specific text of the MFN Clause is unnecessary because it applies only to the 
treatment accorded to such defined investment, but not to the definition of 'investment' itself.").
508 
  See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
509 
  See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
510 
  See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (indicating that umbrella clauses have the effect of bringing certain 
contractual undertakings within the scope of treaty protection).
511 
 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 270-75; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 205-24; MCLACHLAN ET 
AL., supra note 35, at 254-57.
512 
  See supra note 353 and accompanying text; see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 18, at 345 (indicating that these express 
limitations on the scope of MFN treatment may have the effect "to exclude dispute resolution provisions from the scope of the 
MFN treatment provision"); id. at 365 (opining that such language "is understood in [U.S.] BITs not to apply to dispute 
resolution").
513 
  See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
514 
  Compare NAFTA, supra note 55, Art. 1103(1)-(2); with TPP, supra note 320, Art. 9.5(1)-(2).
515 
 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 272-74; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 17, at 210.
516 
 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction PP 118-19 (Nov. 15, 2004).
517 
  See supra notes 100, 391 and accompanying text.
518 
 In a number of awards, tribunals have held that claimants can avoid a requirement to pursue litigation in the courts of the 
host state for 18 months by using the basic treaty's MFN clause to tap into other treaties that have no such condition precedent 
for submission of claims to investor-state arbitration. See, e.g., Hochtief AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision 
on Jurisdiction PP 59-76 (Oct. 24, 2011); National Grid PLC v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction P 93 (June 20, 2006); Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction P 63 (May 16, 2006); Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision 
on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction P 49 (June 17, 2005); Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision 
on Jurisdiction PP 94-110 (Aug. 3, 2004); Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction P 64 (Jan. 25, 
2000).
519 
 In other cases, tribunals have held that claimants cannot use MFN clauses to avoid procedural conditions precedent to 
arbitration set forth in the basic treaty. Kiliç inşaat ithalat Ihracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/01, Award PP 3.1.1, 7.9.1 (July 2, 2013); Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award on 
Jurisdiction P 281 (Aug. 22, 2012); ICS Inspection and Control Servs. Ltd (United Kingdom) v. Argentina, PCA Case No. 2010-9, 
Award on Jurisdiction PP 274-317 (Feb. 10, 2012); Wintershall A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award P 197 
(Dec. 8, 2008).
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 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 274.
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  See supra notes 511-14 and accompanying text.
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 U.S. Trade Rep., Chile Free Trade Agreement, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2016); U.S. Trade Rep., Singapore FTA,available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/singapore-fta (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
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  See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
524 
  See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
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 Ten FTAs have entered into force for Chile since 2004. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
International Investment Agreements Navigator, Chile: Other Investment Agreements, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/41#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). Twelve BITs have 
entered into force for Singapore since 2004. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, Singapore: Bilateral Investment Treaties,available at 
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http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.Org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/190#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
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  See supra notes 396-98 and accompanying text.
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  See supra notes 403-06 and accompanying text.
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  See supra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
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  See supra notes 407-09 and accompanying text.
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  See supra notes 506-21 and accompanying text.
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  See supra notes 100 and accompanying text.
534 
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